Almost as soon as the Union was formed, there was talk of leaving it.
Ironically, at first this talk was concentrated in the North, where it was felt the Constitution unfairly advantaged the South. In 1804, for example, Alexander Hamilton opposed Aaron Burr's campaign for governor of New York in large part because he saw Burr's hybrid ticket – Burr was a Democratic-Republican, but largely supported by Federalists – as a vehicle for secessionism. (Contra the musical, it was this 1804 campaign for governor, not the presidential election of 1800, that led directly to their fateful duel.) A few years later, with Hamilton no longer around to police his fellow Federalists on the matter, the Hartford Convention of 1814-15 proposed Northern secession.
All of this is ironic, because in the end it was of course the South that seceded. Abraham Lincoln was elected president in 1860, on the ticket of the new Republican Party. Lincoln's platform was what I think can fairly be called moderately anti-slavery: he forswore any power to interfere with slavery in the Southern states, but was clear in his own moral opposition to the "peculiar institution," and in his intention to do everything in his lawful power to limit its spread. The Southern states were not in a frame of mind for such nuance, and responded to Lincoln's election by seceding from the Union, one after the other, and forming the Confederate States of America. James Buchanan, Lincoln's predecessor in office, took no action to stop the South from leaving.
Lincoln, famously, sailed a different course. Holding secession unlawful, he prosecuted what we now know as the American Civil War to bring the Southern states back into the fold – or, as he would have put it, to restore republican government to the states in rebellion. For, Lincoln said, they had never actually left the Union: their supposed acts of secession, being unlawful, were null and void. This was his theory of the war, and as he won the war, it has become the theory of the American state.
Was he right? Was secession, in fact, illegal?
The Constitution makes no mention of secession. It specifies no process by which a state, once admitted to the Union, might depart from it. Nor neither does it say, in express and specific language, that no state can ever leave. There is, moreover, no reason to think that the Framers of the Constitution were particularly mindful of the issue of secession, or had a fixed intention on the matter one way or another. Their project was creating a Union that would not just fall apart within a few years, as the Articles of Confederation was in the process of doing.
How, then, can we answer this question?
The answer lies in the nature of the Union. The essential question is this: was the Constitution created by the states, as corporate political bodies, or by the People themselves? If it was created by the states, then it follows, through a certain chain of reasoning, that secession is lawful; if by the People, unlawful.
Not shockingly, it turns out that an enormous amount hinges on the answer to this question. We have already seen the question arise in the context of the question of implied powers. When Maryland had to argue, before the Supreme Court, that Congress has only a narrow and restrictive set of means at its disposal, certainly not including the chartering of a national bank, it laid primary emphasis on the claim that the Constitution had been created by the states. And Chief Justice John Marshall, in ruling against Maryland, began his opinion by explaining why, to the contrary, the Union had been forged by the People. The nature of the Union, then, bears on how we should understand the nature and scope of congressional authority.
And it is not just McCulloch v. Maryland. This question turns up again and again throughout all of constitutional law. My purpose in this module is not to examine each and every issue that hinges on how we understand the nature of the Union. Rather, it is to examine that question itself, so as to lay the foundation for the whole rest of the series. When the issue recurs, we will then be in a position to say, ah, I know what is going on here, this is just a dispute about the nature of the Union, and as I know the right answer to that question, I also know the answer to this one.
Of course the correct answer is Lincoln's: the Constitution was made by the People, and therefore secession was illegal. Correct, that is, not only because Lincoln won the war and made this view correct going forward, but because it was always the better interpretation of the events of 1787-89. Our goal, again, is to understand exactly how and why this is so. As already noted, many of the basic techniques of constitutional interpretation are more or less useless here: the text does not address these questions directly, and the answers cannot be found in any judicial precedent – certainly not from before Lincoln's time. In a sense, it is not really a question of constitutional law at all; it is at a higher level than that. The question is who made the Constitution, and that is not really a question that the Constitution itself can answer.
We will begin our this inquiry by studying the so-called Compact Theory. This is the theory that holds the Constitution to be the creation of the states, a "compact" among them. Compact Theory is the great darkness of American constitutional law, and its most famous champion – John C. Calhoun – the great villain. Our goal will be to understand the logic of the theory, and also how this view of the Union relates to the questions of secession and nullification. This latter refers to the supposed right of individual states to judge the constitutionality of federal laws, and to prevent, within their borders, the enforcement of those laws they deem invalid. Like secession, nullification has reared its ugly head again and again throughout our history, in each case justified by the Compact Theory.
Having studied the villain, we will then turn our attention to the hero. Lincoln's arguments against the lawfulness of secession are the greatest critique of Compact Theory in our history. And, as noted above, Lincoln's theory of the Union has an authoritative quality to it, in light of the Northern victory in the Civil War. When the Supreme Court wrote, in the 1868 case Texas v. White, that the "Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States," it was not really resolving the question, as McCulloch had resolved the question of implied powers. Rather, it was acknowledging that, in consequence of the Civil War, we are living in Lincoln's world, not Calhoun's. The logic of the position comes from Lincoln, and the authority from Appomattox.
But we can examine Lincoln's position on its own merits, and ask whether we think he had the right of things at the outset of the war. Now I have made no secret of the fact that I think the Compact Theory is wrong, was wrong from the outset. But even without embracing Calhoun, we can quibble with Lincoln. Rather famously, he sees the indestructible Union as having begun in 1776, with the Declaration of Independence. We might alternately, following Professor Akhil Amar, date this development to 1787, to the Constitution rather than the Declaration. I tend to favor Lincoln's position over Amar's, and I will talk a little bit about why, and the arguments each way.
My own view, I should say, is that while Lincoln is clearly right and Calhoun is clearly wrong, there is a sense in which things are not so simple. Yes, the Constitution is a creation of the People themselves, and yes this implies that secession and nullification are both unlawful. And yet when we look at the design of the Constitution, and at the way that design came to be, we can see that it reflects a kind of compromise between these two visions. The Great Compromise on the design of Congress, for example, is really a compromise about the nature of the Union. This was never really a coherent position; it is a significant part of what we mean when we say the Civil War was the country working out its internal contradictions. But it is especially incoherent now: the Compact Theory has been long since buried with the Confederacy, but the Constitution's design still accommodates that theory in many key ways.
This point, with which I will close out the module, is of some considerable importance to the project of the Constitutional Innovation Center. It is not wrong to say that the overriding goal of my Reconstitution proposal is to expunge all traces of the Compact Theory from the Constitution. This in turn demonstrates the whole point of Constitutional Perspectives, particularly as a project of this Center: it is through understanding the existing Constitution that we can see how to reform it.


