Welcome back to Constitutional Perspectives! It's time for the second lesson in the module on the question of implied powers. This question first arose, as I said last time, in the context of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's plan to charter a national bank. Today I want to explore the arguments that Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson made against the validity of Hamilton's plan, for this was the first, and really still the greatest, exposition of the case against the existence of implied powers in our history. Then next time we will turn to Hamilton's arguments in defense of Jefferson's assault.
When we left off, Hamilton had just made his Second Report on the Public Credit. The First Report had proposed, most notably, having the federal government assume state debts, and this had just been passed through Congress despite considerable opposition led by Rep. James Madison of Virginia. The Second Report then proposed the chartering of a national bank. This again aroused fierce opposition in Congress, again led by Madison. This time, Madison argued that Hamilton's proposal was unconstitutional. Nowhere did the Constitution give Congress the power to charter a corporation, he said. But he didn't get much traction in Congress, and the House passed the bill 39-20. The Senate already having passed it without much controversy, it went to President Washington's desk to be signed.
Now, in those days it was thought that the president should only refuse to sign legislation if, in his view, it was unconstitutional. Today, it is routine for presidents to veto bills simply because they don't like them as a policy matter. But in the early Republic, this was deemed improper. The veto was seen solely as a tool for defending the Constitution, much as the American colonists had wished King George to use his royal veto to defend the British imperial constitution (as they saw it). Otherwise, signing legislation was seen as an essentially ministerial duty.
Ah, but there was doubt as to the validity of Hamilton's Bank Bill. Washington knew this, from the debates in Congress. And so he asked his Cabinet for their opinions on the matter. Attorney General Edmund Randolph (of Virginia) opined that the bill was unconstitutional. So did Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson (also of Virginia). Hamilton, of course, defended its constitutionality, and it was his opinion that carried the day. Having been convinced by his right-hand man Hamilton, Washington signed the bill, and the First Bank of the United States was chartered.
(This debate was immortalized in song as "Cabinet Battle #1," though the adaptation introduces a couple inaccuracies. The song is framed mostly around the proposal to assume state debts, whereas the actual cabinet battle was about the bank bill. And, relatedly, the cabinet battle happened after the dinner-table bargain, whereas in the play it comes before "The Room Where It Happens." Anyway.)
What we care about is the debate between Hamilton and Jefferson. (Randolph's opinion was odd, and is little remembered. He seemed to think that he could blithely list everything that each power of Congress might comprehend. Hamilton rightly demolishes this cramped view of things.) Often this debate is framed as one regarding the proper construction of the word "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper Clause. Recall that this clause gives Congress the power to
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.
Jefferson, we say, thought that "necessary" should mean something like "strictly necessary," while Hamilton thought it had a broader meaning, encompassing anything which might be "useful" or "convenient." It is true enough that Jefferson says the only means that are "necessary" are those "without which the grant of the power would be nugatory" (i.e., effectively null and void). And it is true that Hamilton says that "necessary often means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to."
But it is wrong to think of this as primarily a debate about text. Both would admit, I think, that as a matter of language alone, the text could bear either meaning. (This is almost always the case with interesting constitutional questions.) Indeed, as I have already stated, in my view it is a mistake to see the question of implied powers as just being about the construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and I think both Jefferson and Hamilton would agree with me on this point. Each of their opinions is rooted in a whole view of the nature of the federal Constitution. It is these views which force us to understand the word "necessary" in a particular way. For to read that word the other way would be to change the nature of the Constitution as a whole.
Let's start with Jefferson. His opinion opens by listing all the ways that the Bank Bill violates state law. These points all sound kind of strange to modern ears. He objects, for example, that the bill would violate state laws of alienage (banning foreigners from owning land). This is because the bank corporation would be able to own land, and aliens would be able to own stock in the corporation. Hamilton for this reason objects to Jefferson's framing, saying that the bill does not violate these laws so much as it "create[s] a kind of person or entity, to which they are inapplicable, and to which the general rule of those laws assign a different regimen." But never mind that. The point is that Jefferson begins by telling us how much violence the bill will do to the laws of the states.
His next point is kind of fascinating. "I consider the foundation of the Constitution," he says, "as laid on this ground that ‘all powers not delegated to the U.S. by the Constitution, not prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states or to the people.’" Now, you might recognize that quoted language: that's what we now call the Tenth Amendment. But the Bill of Rights was ratified in December of 1791, while Jefferson was writing in February. The Tenth Amendment, in other words, had not yet been adopted. You can see this in the way that Jefferson's opinion cites to it as the "XII Amendment," for the Bill of Rights as proposed by Congress had twelve articles originally, two of which were not ratified (at the time – one was adopted two hundred years later).
So Jefferson cannot be appealing to the Tenth Amendment as a source of legal authority. And I think we can see that he is not. Rather, he considers it to express the "foundation of the Constitution." That is, he sees it as merely stating something that was already true of the Constitution as it emerged from the Philadelphia Convention. I think he's pretty plainly right about this. All the Tenth Amendment does is restate the basic implications of the "social contract" theory of our government: since all power belongs originally to the People, all powers not delegated to the government are reserved. This was plainly the theory of the Constitution from the beginning.
It's with the next move that we enter onto shaky ground: "To take a single step," Jefferson writes, "beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition." Really? A single step beyond what is enumerated means that federal power is wholly undefined? What he's asserting here is that the only basis on which the power of Congress can be ascertained is through the enumeration, and therefore that if this criterion is rejected, there can be no other.
Of course anyone familiar with the whole family of modalities of constitutional law knows that this is not quite right. There are other methods besides text: we might be able to infer some limits on the powers of Congress, for example, through structural inference. Moreover, Hamilton would say (and did say) that the existence of implied powers in no way subverts the scheme of limiting Congress through enumeration. Because those implied powers exist only where they are, well, implied by the enumerated powers.
But that isn't good enough for Jefferson, and the rest of his opinion shows why. From the opening passage, Jefferson proceeds to canvass some powers that might be thought to support the Bank Bill, and concludes in each case that they do not. Of course in every case he takes a narrow and literal view of the power in question. The bill cannot be an exercise of the taxing power, he says, because, well, it levies no tax! Of course by this measure the law creating the Internal Revenue Service is not an exercise of the taxing power, either.
But the real action comes once Jefferson arrives at the two "general phrases." One of these is just the Taxing Clause: Jefferson for some reason splits this clause between the laying of taxes to pay the public debts, on the one hand, and the laying of taxes to provide for the general welfare. The latter he sees as potentially capacious. But, he says, it is not a power to do anything which might advance the general welfare, only to lay taxes toward that end. He is right about this, to be clear. The state constitutions all did give their legislatures this sort of power, and the terms in which they did so were quite different than what the Taxing Clause says.
But that's not how Jefferson analyzes the question. He treats the text as plausibly ambiguous. The reason we must reject this broader interpretation, he says, is just that it would render the whole rest of the enumeration of congressional power superfluous. Moreover, it would make Congress something akin to the state legislatures, with their plenary powers, but we know this was not the intention: "Certainly no such universal power was meant to be given them." Rather,
It was intended to lace them up straitly within the enumerated powers, and those without which, as means, these powers could not be be carried into effect.
This is the heart of the matter, and it is a theme that has recurred over and over again in the subsequent history of debates over federal power: we know that Congress was not meant to have a general legislative power, and therefore we must reject any proposed construction that would give it such a power.
The same theme characterizes Jefferson's treatment of the Necessary and Proper Clause. He begins by saying that the various powers "can all be carried into execution without a bank." This, he thinks, decides the matter. That the bank might be convenient to executing the powers, he says, simply must be irrelevant:
If such a latitude of construction be allowed to this phrase as to give any non—enumerated power, it will go to every one, for these is no one which ingenuity may not torture into a convenience, in some way or other, to some one of so long a list of enumerated powers.
(You can practically hear him rolling his eyes at Hamilton here.)
It would swallow up all the delegated powers, and reduce the whole to one phrase as before observed. Therefore it was that the constitution restrained them to the necessary means, that is to say, to those means without which the grant of the power would be nugatory.
This, then, is why Jefferson thinks "necessary" must be given such a narrow reading: because the alternative would allow Congress to do practically anything, so long as it could invent some relation of convenience between that thing and its enumerated powers.
The rest of the opinion can be seen as a demonstration of this point. Jefferson calls into question the notion that the bank would even be so terribly useful. Again, I'm not really well enough versed in Founding-era economics to follow his argument. His overriding legal point, though, is that at best the convenience of the bank is a marginal thing. Everything Hamilton claimed the bank would help with could be done without one. It is, at most, then, "a little difference in the degree of convenience," and this "cannot constitute the necessity which the constitution makes the ground for assuming any non-enumerated power."
Summing up, Jefferson delivers his peroration, which I think captures the whole spirit of his argument nicely:
Can it be thought that the Constitution intended that for a shade or two of convenience, more or less, Congress should be authorised to break down the most antient and fundamental laws of the several states, such as those against Mortmain, the laws of alienage, the rules of descent, the acts of distribution, the laws of escheat and forfeiture, the laws of monopoly? Nothing but a necessity invincible by any other means, can justify such a prostration of laws which constitute the pillars of our whole system of jurisprudence. Will Congress be too strait-laced to carry the constitution into honest effect, unless they may pass over the foundation-laws of the state-governments for the slightest convenience to theirs?
Here we return to the point with which we began. The Bank, as Jefferson sees it, is this grievous intrusion on the laws of the states. This is something extraordinary, and we must not read the Constitution as permitting it if there is any alternative. The states, in other words, remain the primary locus of government, of sovereignty, you might say (although Jefferson's opinion does not use that word). The Constitution should be read to minimize its trespass upon their domain.
Of course, today we are well accustomed to the notion that Congress has total freedom to displace state law insofar as the latter would pose an obstacle to whatever federal program it has in mind. This is the implication of the Supremacy Clause. And, interestingly, Jefferson does not dispute (here) the supremacy of federal law! It is precisely because federal law is supreme, because it has this extraordinary power to override state law, that he thinks it must be so narrowly confined. On this view, the Supremacy Clause is something like a necessary evil: the experience of the Articles had proven that the country could not get along without such a thing, but this was a thing to be mourned rather than celebrated.
It is a coherent vision of the constitutional order. The text – by which I mean not so much the Necessary and Proper Clause in particular, but the entire device of enumeration – is a reflection of the deep structure and character of the thing, as Jefferson sees it. And he is absolutely right that the doctrine of implied powers poses an existential threat to the constitutional order so understood. His core argument for why "necessary" must be given a narrow construction is essentially doctrinal: if it were given a broad construction, that would imply X, but we know for certain that X is not true. Like a true master, Jefferson is weaving together all the different forms of constitutional law to support his view.
Ah, but it turns out this does not mean his is the only coherent view of the matter. Indeed, his was not the view that prevailed. No, the constitutional order we have today is the one Hamilton envisioned. That vision denies essentially every claim Jefferson makes: the problem with his argument is not really the reasoning, it is that he fundamentally misapprehends the nature of the Constitution.
All of that next time.


