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The Question of Implied Powers, Part VII: The Legacy of McCulloch

Welcome back to Constitutional Perspectives!

For the past several lessons, we have been studying the Supreme Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), the decisive moment in the controversy around the doctrine of implied powers. In that case, Chief Justice John Marshall upheld the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States. In the process, he formally adopted Hamilton's "broad constructionist" view of federal power, and rejected Jefferson's "strict constructionist" position. He also held that the state could not impose taxes on the Bank's operation, for reasons relating to federal supremacy.

That was the end of the story, right?

Well, not exactly. The Bank itself continued operation for the duration of its twenty-year charter... more or less. That charter was due to expire in 1836, but in 1828 a man by the name of Andrew Jackson had ascended to the presidency. And he hated the Bank – for reasons that, honestly, I'm kind of surprised weren't actually antisemitic, because they sure resemble antisemitic conspiracy theories about Jewish bankers. (Nor neither was his hatred of the Bank rooted in Anti-Masonry, even though that was riding high at the time. He himself was a Freemason, after all.)

In 1832, on the eve of Jackson's re-election campaign against Senator Henry Clay, this tension exploded into what historians know as the Bank War. Clay, and the other supporters of the Bank, sought an early extension of the charter, and indeed secured the passage thereof through Congress. But Jackson vetoed the bill. His veto message combined both policy and legal critiques, and he drew some criticism for the former: Jackson was the great innovator in vetoing legislation on other than constitutional grounds, and his Whig opponents saw this as an overreach.

But in this case, the policy arguments were tied in with the constitutional ones. Jackson disputed that McCulloch should be seen as controlling for the entire government, expressing a view called "departmentalism," i.e. the notion that each branch of the government could and should judge constitutional questions for itself, in the exercise of their respective functions. But he also suggested that, even taking McCulloch as binding, it was still entirely proper for the president, as part of the legislative process, to do exactly what Marshall said he could not do: evaluate the degree to which the proposed measure really was needful for carrying out Congress's enumerated powers. Doing so, Jackson suggested that various details of the new Bank Bill were not really necessary, that they intruded upon the rights of the states or even improperly transferred powers to a private corporation powers that belong only to Congress in ways that were hardly proper.

Jackson's veto is often seen as a dying gasp of Jeffersonian constitutionalism. And that is not wrong, exactly. But it is also notable what his veto message did not claim. He did not argue that Congress could not charter a corporation. He did not adopt Jefferson's narrow construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause, or deny broadly that Congress has a broad choice of means in carrying out its powers. Now, to some extent this is because he thought he could make the argument even under the McCulloch standard; he seems to have been taking the principles of McCulloch as granted for the sake of argument. But still, this is, in its own way, a sign of the enduring triumph of the broad construction, of Hamilton's vision over Jefferson's – even as it was the death of one of Hamilton's great projects.

Jackson's opponents may have hoped that vetoing the Bank renewal would hurt Jackson in the 1832 election. It, uhhh, didn't seem to. He won, resoundingly. And throughout his second term, he set about undermining the Bank even before its charter expired. This led to an economic panic in 1837, the, uhhh, Panic of 1837. But Jackson was out of office by then, his successor Martin Van Buren left holding the bag. Jackson had got what he wanted: the Bank was dead, not to return for many generations. Although some kind of national bank was still a part of the Whig economic platform after Jackson's time, nothing of the sort would actually be created until... 1913, when Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act.

Of course, McCulloch was not just about the national bank. The Bank was just the terrain on which a broader battle was fought. Jefferson and Madison had denied that Congress could charter any corporation, not just a bank. Hamilton and then Marshall had, in turn, affirmed this power. Today there are dozens of federally-chartered corporations. I don't even know the exact number, despite having tried to look it up, because it is not always easy to tell the difference between a government agency and a federal corporation. A lot of what the federal government does, it does through corporations. The Federal Reserve Banks are corporations. So is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting. You get the idea.

And let's not forget that the question of implied powers is quite a bit broader than just corporations. Recall Hamilton's point that the legislation providing for the building of lighthouses along the Atlantic coast was not, directly, an exercise of any enumerated power. Suppose that McCulloch had been decided the other way, perhaps because Jefferson was able to replace Marshall on the Court at some point. The specific implication would have been to destroy the Bank in a moment (saving Jackson some trouble). But presumably, in time, someone would have thought to ask whether the lighthouses act had been valid. The courts, in particular, would have had to figure out exactly what this decision entailed.

That's how legal adjudication works. Someone would, before long, have brought another case challenging some other federal program as invalid. And, quite likely, that next challenge would have succeeded. Because Hamilton is right: Congress had never confined itself to those measures "strictly" necessary for carrying out its enumerated powers. Adopting Jefferson's principles would have marked a radical break with past practice, and thus would have required the Court to go through the whole corpus of federal laws and root out every exercise of an implied power. We live in the world where this never happened. From our point of view, then, the fight over implied powers was a fight over the national bank. But in that other world, the world where Jefferson's side prevailed, that would not really be the case. The Bank would have been just the beginning.

Thankfully, we are not in that world. Jackson's attack on the Bank notwithstanding, the principle of McCulloch has not seriously been questioned since 1819. More than this, in fact: it was expressly written into the Constitution! The next amendment adopted after McCulloch was decided was the Thirteenth Amendment, in 1865, upon the resolution of the Civil War. We, of course, remember it for its first section, the one that bans slavery within the United States. But there is a second section, too:

Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

The Fourteenth Amendment, proposed the following year and ratified in 1868, likewise ends with this language, in its Section Five:

The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Finally, the Fifteenth Amendment – granting black suffrage – said in its second section that

The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Emphasis added in all cases. These three sections can be seen as local Necessary and Proper Clauses. And you can be sure that the men who wrote them were aware of McCulloch. Indeed, they openly referenced McCulloch in the congressional debates over these amendments. They specifically intended these enforcement clauses as conferring a broad authority under the flexible standard of McCulloch. How do we tell, then, whether a piece of enforcement legislation is valid? Why, by using the McCulloch test! You know the one: "Let the end be legitimate..." and all that.

We think of McCulloch, correctly, as the defining case about federal power. But, through the Reconstruction Amendments, there is a connection between federal power and civil rights: namely that there is a federal power to enforce civil rights. And McCulloch applies to that power, just as much as to those listed in Article I. It applies to this power because the Constitution says so, in just about so many words.

Now, the actual history of the McCulloch standard being used in evaluating civil rights laws is kind of uneven. Famously, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbade racial discrimination in all places of public accommodation, was framed not so much as an act to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment but as an exercise of the Commerce Clause power. This was due to a decision shortly after Reconstruction, the so-called Civil Rights Cases of 1883, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not reach private discrimination, only discrimination by the states themselves. The Court upheld the Civil Rights Act under the Commerce Clause, in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964); the case concerned the scope of the Commerce power more than anything directly McCulloch-related.

Four year later, however, the Court decided a case called Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. (1968), about the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. The case was one of discrimination in the sale of real estate: the plaintiff, one Joseph Lee Jones, had been unable to buy a house because he was black. He sued under, not the Civil Rights Act of 1964, nor the Act of 1968 (better known as the Fair Housing Act), but the Act of 1866. This was the very first civil rights bill, passed at the height of Reconstruction itself; one of the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment was to remove any doubts as to its validity.

But, of course, when it was passed, the 1866 Act was conceived as an act enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment; the Fourteenth didn't exist yet, after all. This is where the doubts came from. Because all the Thirteenth Amendment says is that slavery is no more. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 went much further. Its central provision proclaimed that

[All] citizens, of every race and color ... shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.

The bolded sentence, eventually codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1982, was what Mr. Jones sued under, over one hundred years later. His suit raised two questions. The first was whether this language forbade private discrimination as well as public. The Court held, by a vote of 7-2, that it did so.

This, of course, raised the question of constitutionality. Could such a far-reaching statute truly be called an enforcement of the abolition of slavery? Recall, first, that the Fourteenth Amendment had been passed in large part to answer these doubts, and second that the Fourteenth Amendment had then been held not to reach private discrimination.

No matter. Yes, the Court said: the 1866 Act, construed as applying to private discrimination, was absolutely a valid measure to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. This is because, as the very Civil Rights Cases themselves had acknowledged, that the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the "power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery," not just slavery itself. And this must mean, the 1968 Court reasoned, that Congress also has the power "rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation." In other words, the question of whether discrimination in the sale of real property is a "badge of slavery" is itself up to Congress.

All of this should sound familiar: it is just McCulloch. Indeed, the concluding passage of Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Jones v. Alfred Meyer specifically recalled that Representative James Wilson of Iowa, the floor manager for the 1866 Civil Rights Act, had expressly invoked McCulloch in defending the validity of the Act:

"The end is legitimate," the Congressman said, "because it is defined by the Constitution itself. The end is the maintenance of freedom ... A man who enjoys the civil rights mentioned in this bill cannot be reduced to slavery ... This settles the appropriateness of this measure, and that settles its constitutionality.

A few other cases decided around the same time are similar. South Carolina v. Katzenbach and Katzenbach v. Morgan, both decided in 1966, concerned the validity of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: the former the "preclearance" provision requiring certain states to get permission from the federal Department of Justice before changing their election laws, the latter the ban on literacy tests. Both were upheld, the former under the Fifteenth Amendment, the latter under the Fourteenth. Both decisions said in so many words that the standard under the Enforcement Clauses is McCulloch.

Unfortunately, subsequent decisions have not shown a comparable respect for the breadth of congressional authority under the Reconstruction Amendments. Most notably, in City of Boerne v. Flores (1998), the Court held that measures under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot go beyond what Section One of the Amendment requires, as it has been construed by the federal judiciary. The case is kind of a messy one, involving an attempt by Congress to overturn a decision – Employment Division v. Smith (1990) – that had narrowed the construction of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. There are other reasons to doubt the validity of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the result because he thought RFRA violated the Establishment Clause. But focusing solely on the question of the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, City of Boerne is a grievous betrayal of Jones v. Alfred Mayer, and of the deliberate incorporation of the McCulloch standard into the Reconstruction Amendments.

There is one final piece of McCulloch's legacy that I cannot fail to mention. So far I have just been discussing the legacy of the decision on the first question – sensibly enough, for it is that question that this module is concerned with. But the decision on the second question has a legacy all of its own: the so-called "intergovernmental tax immunity" doctrine. That is, you may have noticed, an absolutely horrid name, and it was an absolutely horrid doctrine. It concerned itself with the question of whether, and under what circumstances, the state and federal governments can tax one another.

Now, you might think that McCulloch just settled this question: the federal government can tax the states, but the states cannot tax the federal government, because the whole may judge the part but the part cannot judge the whole. Things are not quite so tidy, however. The rule that emerged in the cases shortly after McCulloch (by which I mean, basically, over the whole course of the twentieth century) was that neither side could tax the other. This went so far as to say that even the salaries of federal employees were exempt from state taxes (Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County (1842)), and also that state employees were exempt from the federal income tax (Collector v. Day (1870)).

This is not the law anymore. The tide went out in the mid-twentieth century, partly because the doctrine required the courts to draw essentially arbitrary lines about which state government functions were sufficiently "fundamental" as to be covered by the immunity from federal taxes. Dobbins was abrogated by statute in the Public Salaries Act of 1939, which makes federal employees subject to state taxation on the same terms as everyone else. The McCulloch immunity, it turns out, is not mandatory: Congress can always waive it, if it so chooses. Marshall's opinion does not expressly countenance this possibility, but it makes sense. Congress has the power to preserve its creations, and states cannot have any power inconsistent with that. But Congress is not necessarily obliged to exercise that power to its fullest extent, if it does not want to.

In the very same year, Collector v. Day was overruled by Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe (1939). Graves adopted the same rule as the Public Salaries Act: state officials' salaries are subject to federal income tax, on exactly the same terms as everybody else's. This is, broadly, the principle of the modern doctrine: state and federal governments are subject to each others' general taxes, but cannot tax one another specifically. A state could not tax federal workers' incomes at a special, higher rate, and nor could Congress impose a special, higher tax rate for state employees. Something like this rule is expressly suggested in McCulloch, where Marshall says that the rule he announced does not "extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in common with the other real property within the State." What made the Maryland tax on the Bank intolerable is that it applied specifically to the Bank, to a federal instrumentality as such.

I should say that the sketch of the doctrine given here is not nearly unpleasant enough. The case of government employees' salaries is fairly crisp, but most of the cases concern things like the interest from municipal bonds. I literally do not know the details of the doctrine, because it's massively unpleasant to try to wrap one's head around. Plus, as the Public Salaries Act shows, to some degree this is a zone of "fake constitutional law," a term I use (derisively) to refer to areas where the supposed constitutional rule is only a default, and can be altered by Congress if it wishes. (The other big one of these is the so-called "dormant Commerce Clause," which we will meet eventually.) Really, the whole doctrine just does not deserve to be something that originated in McCulloch.

With that, I have come to the end of my tale. But there will be one final lesson in this module, about the second great constitutional controversy: the question of internal improvements. Although analytically distinct from the question of implied powers, it has a lot in common, and fits better here than anywhere else. So I'll be back next week for that!

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