Welcome back to Constitutional Perspectives!
Today it's time for Part Four of our module on the question of implied powers. This, you may recall, is the question of whether, in addition to its enumerated powers, Congress has a broad choice of means by which it can carry those powers into effect – or, conversely, whether it can only use those means strictly necessary to effectuating the express powers, those without which, in Thomas Jefferson's words, the grant of power would be "nugatory." Last time we examined Alexander Hamilton's argument for the "broad" answer to this question, given in the form of advice to President Washington on whether he should sign the bill establishing a national bank. This proposal – authored, of course, by Hamilton himself – had raised the question of implied powers for the first time in our history, because Congress has no express power to charter a corporation.
Of course it was Hamilton's opinion, not those of Jefferson or Edmund Randolph, that persuaded Washington. He signed the Bank Bill into law, and the First Bank of the United States was chartered on February 25th, 1791, for a twenty-year term. In 1811, when the charter expired, James Madison – who, you may recall, had led the charge against the bank in the House of Representatives – was president, and Hamilton was dead, killed in his infamous 1804 duel with Aaron Burr. So the charter lapsed, and was not renewed... until 1816, when Madison changed his mind. He had spent the previous four years prosecuting what we now know as the War of 1812 (often called "Mr. Madison's War" at the time). And his experiences during the war had persuaded him that, dammit, Hamilton was right about how important a bank would be for the national defense.
Thus came into being the Second Bank of the United States. But although Madison himself had dropped them, the objections he had made against the First Bank a generation prior still had currency. A number of states took aggressive action against the Second Bank, viewing it as both unconstitutional and a threat to their own banks. Maryland, to take but one example, imposed a hefty tax on the operation, within its borders, of any bank not chartered by Maryland itself. Of course the only bank answering to this description was the Bank of the United States.
It fell to the manager of the Baltimore branch of the national bank to pay this tax. His names was James McCulloch. But he refused to pay, claiming that Maryland had no right to impose this tax. The Bank, after all, was a federal instrumentality, and federal law was supreme over state law. Maryland brought a collection action against Mr. McCulloch, in its own state courts. This is how a lot of constitutional litigation worked, especially in the old days. Ostensibly, all Maryland was claiming was that McCulloch owed some money. But to decide whether or not to grant that relief, the courts had to decide constitutional questions of the highest import. To the surprise of no one, the Maryland state courts ruled that, yes, McCulloch did have to pay the tax. But the Supreme Court of the United States has appellate jurisdiction in this sort of case, precisely because the state courts could not be trusted to give due consideration to the demands of federal law. Mr. McCulloch availed himself of that jurisdiction by filing an appeal, and so the case fell on Chief Justice John Marshall's doorstep.
This is our first time meeting John Marshall; it will not be the last. To this day, he is accounted the greatest Chief Justice in American history, and likely the greatest jurist full stop. He had held that post since 1801, when John Adams put him on the Court in the waning days of his presidency. Right from the beginning of his tenure as Chief, Marshall was the Last Federalist Standing. Hamilton was dead, Adams had been defeated in Jefferson's Revolution of 1800. The Federalist Party had been moribund ever since, and had basically collapsed after an embarrassing sequence at the end of the War of 1812. But Marshall had life tenure in one of the most important positions in the government, and he ended up serving until his death in 1835, having been a primary antagonist for both Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson.
Largely because he knew the Court had become the last bastion of the Federalist project, Marshall worked hard to build up its authority, its institutional standing. Prior to his appointment, the Court had been held in such low repute that it was difficult to convince anyone noteworthy to serve on it. And President Jefferson knew Marshall to be his enemy, and schemed to, basically, destroy the Court. The 1802 Supreme Court term was canceled altogether, and as we will see in a future module, Jefferson had planned to use a dispute involving the commission of a certain William Marbury as an occasion to demonstrate the Court's impotence. Marshall deftly navigated through those early crises, however, and gradually built the Court into what, in my view, it was always meant to be: the primary forum for the resolution of controversies about the meaning of the federal Constitution. And under Marshall's leadership, those controversies were almost universally resolved in favor of Hamilton's vision, and against Jefferson's.
Indeed we might call Marshall the Last Hamiltonian. They had met during the war, when Hamilton had been Washington's aide-de-camp and Marshall had been a lieutenant, then a captain, in the army. Although they were the same age (plus or minus; there is some dispute about the exact date of Hamilton's birth), Marshall became a bit of a disciple of Hamilton's. And as Chief Justice, he kept the flame of Hamilton's project alive for thirty years after the fateful duel with Burr. Like Hamilton, Marshall took a broad view of federal power – congressional and judicial alike. (Hamilton also had an expansive conception of executive power, for good measure; Marshall had few occasions to pass upon that topic.)
Indeed, in both of the cases for which he is best known – McCulloch and Marbury – Marshall was largely just restating things Hamilton had said years prior, often paraphrasing whole lengthy passages of Hamilton's writing. This is easy to miss, because Marshall had a tendency to write his opinions from the ground up, analyzing the question from first principles, as though no one had ever had occasion to consider the matter before. Somewhat against type, though, he does acknowledge in McCulloch that he was not writing on a blank slate. His sketch of the history of the issue is actually pretty funny:
The power now contested was exercised by the first Congress elected under the present Constitution. The bill for incorporating the Bank of the United States did not steal upon an unsuspecting legislature and pass unobserved. Its principle was completely understood, and was opposed with equal zeal and ability.
(By James Madison.)
After being resisted first in the fair and open field of debate, and afterwards in the executive cabinet, with as much persevering talent as any measure has ever experienced,
(Here he means Jefferson.)
and being supported by arguments which convinced minds as pure and as intelligent as this country can boast,
(That's Washington.)
it became a law. The original act was permitted to expire, but a short experience of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive it exposed the Government convinced those who were most prejudiced against the measure
(Madison, again.)
of its necessity, and induced the passage of the present law.
Now, Marshall is not just recounting this history for the fun of it; there is legal weight to these observations. But I don't want to get into that quite yet. The next lesson will examine Marshall's argument in detail. Spoiler alert: he ruled in McCulloch's favor, upholding the Bank and invalidating the tax Maryland had assessed.
But this is the first time in the series that we are reading a judicial opinion, and so I want to take a moment to talk about what judicial opinions are, and how to understand them. The comparison between Marshall's opinion and Hamilton's is instructive here, because although we use the same word for each, they are not really the same kind of thing. Hamilton's essay is an exercise in persuasion. The decision on the Bank Bill had fallen to Washington, who had solicited advice from his Cabinet.
A judicial opinion is not like this at all. The judge is not trying to persuade someone else to act: they, themselves, are the one taking the action. And the opinion is the authoritative account of the basis for that action. Washington, you'll note, never wrote anything on the topic of the Bank Bill, he just signed it into law. (Had he vetoed the bill, though, he would have been constitutionally required to send Congress a message with the reasons for the veto.) Hamilton and Jefferson had no power of their own; to affect the outcome, they had to persuade Washington. The judge who writes an opinion, conversely, is also the judge who decides the case. It is their own power that they are exercising; they need no one else's permission to use it as they see fit.
Why, then, do judges write opinions, if not to persuade? The answer lies in the nature of the judicial power. In The Federalist No. 78, Hamilton famously wrote of the judiciary that it "may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment." The interesting comparison here is with Congress, which holds the quality of WILL in Hamilton's schematic. In general, representative legislatures do not need to give reasons for their actions. It is enough of a reason to do a thing that the legislature wants to do that thing. This is because the legislature represents the People, and the premise of our system of government is that the People have a broad right, within certain limits, to see their will carried out.
Courts aren't like that at all. It is never meant to be enough for a court to say "I want to do it." That would be an exercise of will, which properly belongs to the legislature. Instead, the task of a judge is to decide cases according to law. Disputes arise, and are brought before the courts, typically by one party seeking some kind of relief against another. The courts must then decide what to do, whether to grant the relief sought or not. Once upon a time, when these disputes would have been brought before a king holding court (yes, this is where the word comes from), they would have been decided according to the will of the king. But our law courts, instead, are to decide them according to law.
That is to say, they are to decide them with reference to pre-existing legal materials, sources of legal authority, that tell the judge what to do. Sifting through these materials, the judge will find some applicable legal rule, a "rule of decision," that tells them whether or not to grant relief in a case with this particular pattern of facts. And it is not enough to know that the judge has undertaken this inquiry, in the privacy of their chambers. They must be seen to be deciding cases according to law, not according to their own will. And the way that they demonstrate this is by writing opinions.
The analysis contained in judicial opinions, then, is a kind of ritual, a performance of Decision According To Law. The judge will (with more or less brevity) describe the facts of the case, they will announce (possibly after extended consideration) the legal rule that applies, and then by applying that rule to those facts they will reach their decision. Through this ritual, our faith is maintained that the judges are performing their assigned task, and not merely ruling according to personal will or whimsy.
There is another dimension to it, as well. One aspect of decision according to law is consistency. We think that like cases ought to be decided alike. But how do we know which cases are like which other cases? Through the practice of reasoned decision-making. When we decide one case according to a particular rule, we are committing ourselves as well to deciding other cases under that same rule, so far as it applies. Now, this is only the beginning of the answer: there is a great art in determining whether or not the principle of one case should also govern a second. But it is the beginning of the answer.
And it helps to explain the real significance of judicial opinions. Because of this obligation of consistency, each decision is not just about the case at bar. Yes, the opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland is an explanation of why James McCulloch did not have to pay Maryland a bunch of money. But it is far more than that: it is a choice between two different visions of what the law could be. Marshall could have written the opinion the other way. You'll recall that I said of Jefferson's opinion on the matter that it offered a perfectly coherent vision of the law. And Marshall could have adopted it. Maryland was urging him to; the materials of constitutional law would have provided him everything he needed to write a Jeffersonian opinion. The result of which would have been, not just that Mr. McCulloch had to pay his tax, but that the Court had rejected the doctrine of implied powers across the board. Another case would have arisen, challenging some other federal action as inconsistent with the rule announced in (bizarro) McCulloch, and another, and another.
For this reason, it is wrong to think of judicial opinions merely as "explanations" for actions. Rather, they are part and parcel of the action itself. Indeed, you can often see this in the language of the opinion. The "action" part, which we call the "disposition," will be at the very end, and it might say something like, "For the foregoing reasons, the judgment below is AFFIRMED." That first clause matters! To affirm the judgment for this set of reasons is different than to affirm it for some other set of reasons, or without reason. A judgment might be affirmed for some procedural reason, and this will have different implications than if it is affirmed "on the merits." The reasons are part of the act: to act according to a certain principle is to commit yourself to that principle, to make yourself the kind of person (or court, or government) that will act according to that principle, not just today but tomorrow.
Anyway. I hope this digression into the philosophy of judicial opinions has been helpful. For a somewhat more concrete beginner's guide to the topic, you can also check out this wonderful short essay by Orin Kerr.
And I invite you, so armed, to go read the opinion in McCulloch. It doesn't bite! Okay, it is kind of strange in some ways, by modern standards. Back in those days, cases would often be reported with not only the judge's opinion but also the arguments of the lawyers. The actual opinion of the Court only starts where it says "MARSHALL, Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court." And there's rather less recounting of the facts than you might get in a modern opinion; Marshall writes on the assumption that everyone basically knows the scenario. Which you are, because I have just sketched it out for you. For now you should focus on the discussion of the first question, the validity of the Bank itself, which runs from the start of Marshall's opinion through to the paragraph, on page 425 of the reporter, that begins "It being the opinion of the Court..."
I'll be back next time, to analyze that section of the opinion in great detail.


