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The Question of Implied Powers, Part III: Cabinet Battle #1 (Hamilton's Response)

Welcome back to Constitutional Perspectives! Today, it's time for the third lesson in our module on the question of implied powers.

Last time we examined Thomas Jefferson's opinion on the constitutionality of the bill establishing the First Bank of the United States. Jefferson – asked by President George Washington for his opinion, in his capacity as Secretary of State – said that the bill was unlawful, because Congress does not have the power to charter a corporation. In his opinion, Jefferson articulated an exceedingly narrow view of the implied powers of Congress. In his view, Congress can only use those means that are strictly necessary to carrying out one or more of its enumerated powers, or in other words, those "without which the grant of the power would be nugatory." The Bank was, at most, a matter of mild convenience, and this, Jefferson said, could never be enough to support trampling over the ancient laws of the states. If it were, then there would be no limits to Congress's power at all, for there would always be some smart fellow to explain why a given measure was expedient.

Today it's the smart fellow's turn.

Washington had asked his whole Cabinet for opinions on the Bank Bill. That included his Treasury Secretary. Who, as it happened, was also the architect of the Bank Bill. To the surprise of no one, Alexander Hamilton argued, counter to the views of Jefferson and Attorney General Edmund Randolph, that the bill was constitutional. Hamilton's opinion is long, much longer than Jefferson's and Randolph's opinions combined. But it is worth parsing carefully, for it was Hamilton's view that prevailed; Hamilton's view that, through John Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), became the basis for our understanding of federal power.

Hamilton begins by admitting, frankly, that he has a personal connection to the matter, as the author of the measure in question. But, he says, his interest in the matter is not so much because of this personal connection but rather arises from "firm persuasion, that principles of construction like those espoused by [Jefferson and Randolph] would be fatal to the just & indispensible authority of the United States." He then articulates the principle on which he would decide the case, which indeed makes him think that the case is an easy one and should never have aroused serious controversy:

Now it appears to the Secretary of the Treasury, that this general principle is inherent in the very definition of Government and
essential to every step of the progress to be made by that of the United States; namely—that every power vested in a Government is in its nature sovereign, and includes by force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite, and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power; and which are not precluded by restrictions & exceptions specified in the constitution; or not immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of political society.

Yes, all of that emphasis is Hamilton's.

The confusion, he suggests, arises because of the division of sovereign power between the states and the federal government. But it really should not. That sovereign power is divided does not mean, cannot mean, that it lacks the character of sovereignty. It only means that each part of the government is sovereign with regard to some things and not others. Within the scope of its enumerated powers, then, Congress is sovereign no less than the states are within the scope of their powers (which are not, Hamilton notes, unlimited: Article I, Section 10 imposes a whole series of very specific limits on the states).

Now, Hamilton's fellow Federalist James Wilson would scold him a little for imprecision of language here. Hamilton speaks of the government as sovereign; Wilson was careful always to insist that it is only ever the People who are sovereign. Democratic governments, Wilson thought, never acquire the character of sovereignty; instead they only hold a specific portion of the People's sovereign powers, as delegated through constitutions. Hamilton does not actually disagree with Wilson about this; indeed he alludes to the principle that all government power is delegated a few paragraphs down. He is simply not as careful in his language, and we should understand what he is saying accordingly.

Anyway. The sovereign character of federal power, within the scope of the enumerated powers, decides the matter for Hamilton. All agree, he says, that creating corporations is "incident to sovereign power." Hence, it must be incident to the power of the federal government, "in relation to the objects intrusted to [it]." The states, with their plenary power, have the ability to create corporations pertaining to anything. The only difference with Congress is that it has a power to create corporations only insofar as they pertain to the enumerated powers.

Again, Hamilton is essentially saying: what's the big deal? Why is everyone so hung up on this?

A strange fallacy seems to have crept into the manner of thinking & reasoning upon the subject. Imagination appears to have been unusually busy concerning it. An incorporation seems to have been regarded as some great, independent, substantive thing—as a political end of peculiar magnitude & moment; whereas it is truly to be considered as a quality, capacity, or mean to an end.

In other words, Hamilton is saying, it is not strange that the Constitution does not expressly speak of the power to create corporations. That is not what the enumerated powers are about. They are about the ends entrusted to the federal government, about the scope of its authority. They are not about the means which may be used in pursuit of those ends. Those are implied, in the grants of power and in the general character of federal authority – a character which is recognized by the Necessary and Proper Clause, which "gives an explicit sanction to the doctrine of implied powers, and is equivalent to an admission of the proposition, that the government, as to its specified powers and objects, has plenary & sovereign authority."

Jefferson had referred, in his opinion, to a moment at the Constitutional Convention when it had been proposed to give Congress an express power to charter corporations. This proposal had been rejected. "It is known," he wrote, "that the very power now proposed as a means, was rejected as an end, by the Convention which formed the constitution." Hamilton questions this account of things, saying that there is no "authentic document," or even "accurate recollection," of the exchange Jefferson is talking about. (Hamilton, of course, was at the Convention; Jefferson was not.) More to the point, though, he says that even if it happened the way Jefferson says, that doesn't mean what Jefferson thinks:

Some again alledge, that it was disagreed to, because it was thought improper to vest in Congress a power of erecting corporations—others, because it was thought unnecessary to specify the power.

The proposal was rejected, Hamilton suggests, precisely because Article I, Section 8 is not meant to be an enumeration of means, but of ends. This is no way implies that Congress was not meant to have this power in its arsenal for pursuing its enumerated ends.

Indeed, he notes, there is one case where all would agree that Congress has the implied power to form corporations: in the exercise of its power to "exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the capital district (and also over other federal properties). (Article I, Section 8, clause 17.) This, he says, is the power "to do in respect to those places, all that any government whatever may do." And this necessarily includes the power to form corporations, for any purpose at all, just as states may form corporations for any purpose at all. Elsewhere he notes Congress's similar power over the territories, which certainly includes forming corporations – not least the corporate entities that are to govern the territories. Here is one case, then, where Congress is without a doubt given the power to charter corporations without the use of those words. But Jefferson and Randolph deny that Congress has this power in any case; Jefferson goes so far as to call it "a right remaining exclusively with the states." This simply cannot be right.

Now, Jefferson and Randolph do not address this point; Hamilton was writing in response to their opinions, and they did not ever reply to his arguments. But we can imagine a way they might respond to this point. Yes, Congress's power over federal property (including the territories) includes the power of creating corporations. This is because Congress has plenary power over these possessions; that is, the same quality of power that the states have within their own territories. Congress's other powers are not like that; they are confined to specific purposes.

But we can imagine Hamilton's response to this point as well. Sure, the other powers are limited not by conditions of place but of purpose. But it is still true that within those limits they are all-encompassing. The power to tax is the power to impose whatever taxes Congress sees fit. The power to regulate commerce is the power to regulate commerce however Congress sees fit. And so on. This is exactly what he has been saying all along: that Congress's powers, though limited, are sovereign in character within those limits, and that this necessarily includes a broad choice of means.

This, then, is Hamilton's positive case for the bank bill: not only as constitutional, but as unremarkably so. Much of the rest of his opinion is taken up responding to particular points Jefferson and Randolph had made. Of these, the most interesting by far is his response to Jefferson's view of the word "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper Clause. He, uhhh, really really doesn't like this view:

It is essential to the being of the National government, that so erroneous a conception of the meaning of the word necessary, should be exploded.

Exploded! Tell us how you really feel, Alex.

And he does. He begins by observing – and this is, sadly, the part of the opinion most remembered – that "neither the grammatical, nor popular sense of the term requires" Jefferson's narrow construction:

According to both, necessary often means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to. It is a common mode of expression to say, that it is necessary for a government or a person to do this or that thing, when nothing more is intended or understood, than that the interests of the government or person require, or will be promoted, by the doing of this or that thing.

But of course his argument does not really rest on the plain meaning of this one word. Rather, he says, we know that this is how the Constitution uses the word: "The whole turn of the clause containing it, indicates, that it was the intent of the convention, by that clause to give a liberal latitude to the exercise of the specified powers," for "the expressions have peculiar comprehensiveness."

This makes sense, because the Constitution as Jefferson imagines it would simply be unworkable. Hamilton hits again and again on this point: that Jefferson would make the validity of an act of Congress depend on its expediency. But while the "expediency of exercising a particular power, at a particular time, must indeed depend on circumstances," Hamilton says, "the constitutional right of exercising it must be uniform & invariable—the same to day, as to morrow."

This is a really fascinating point, and I think actually quite different from how we think about things today. We would be more likely to express this point in terms of trust, and presumption: that the judiciary must trust Congress's view on questions of expediency. Hamilton is saying something a bit different: that the power must be said to exist even where and when it would not be expedient.

I think Jefferson might dispute Hamilton's charge that he would make the validity of a measure depend on its expediency. He had argued, after all, that marginal convenience could not be enough to show that the Bank Bill was lawful. It is the criterion of strict necessity, I imagine he would say, that would make congressional power "uniform & invariable."

But Hamilton doesn't think so. He attacks Jefferson's account of why the Bank would be only marginally convenient at best, which depends entirely on the existence of other banks chartered by the states. These, Hamilton says, are "institutions which happen to exist to day, & for ought that concerns the government of the United States, may disappear to morrow." Jefferson, then, has a choice. He could concede that, were these state banks to disappear, Congress could act to fill the void. But this would leave the scope of federal power to vary with circumstance. Or he could deny this, and leave the federal government's ability to carry out its constitutional functions at the mercy of the states.

Neither is acceptable. And if that is so, then federal power must be held to include, at all times, all those powers, all those means, which might become essential under any conditions that might arise. Jefferson would essentially reduce all the implied powers of Congress to emergency powers, available only in "palpable & extreme" cases. But this, Hamilton says, is "rather a rule to justify the overleaping of the bounds of constitutional authority, than to govern the ordinary exercise of it." This is a neat point, for it is true enough that our Constitution has almost no provision for emergency powers. And Jefferson's construction would not apply only to certain extraordinary powers, like the suspension of habeas corpus (the one express emergency power we do have): it would make "extreme necessity" the "criterion of the exercise of any implied power." (Emphasis mine, this time.)

This, Hamilton says, had hardly been the actual practice of the government in its young life. To the contrary, "every act which has been passed is more or less an exemplification of" the doctrine of implied powers. Hence why he says over and over that everyone admits that there are some implied powers, that they are granted by the Constitution every bit as much as the express powers. As a specific example he points to the 1789 act providing for the creation of (most notably) lighthouses. This, he says, can only have been an exercise of Congress's power to regulate trade. But it cannot be thought strictly necessary to the exercise of that power: it is not as though, without the power to build lighthouses, Congress would have no power to regulate trade.

Here we see the radical inconsistency between Jefferson's test of necessity and the nature of the legislative power itself. That power, you may recall, is derived from the natural right that every individual has, in the so-called "state of nature," to govern their own conduct, or in other words, to decide what to do in any given moment. The ingredient of choice is essential. To give Congress the power to regulate trade is necessarily to give it the right to choose how, exactly, trade is to be regulated. You could imagine Congress deciding that lighthouses weren't important. But, in fact, it decided that they were. The power could have been used one way, but was used another. Jefferson's test would destroy this power to choose.

Toward the end of in his opinion, Hamilton notes that the whole shape of the express powers bespeaks a clear design "to vest in congress all the powers requisite to the effectual administration of the finances of the United States" in particular. (Again, emphasis mine.) It has the power to tax, to borrow, to coin money. Moreover, we know that this was one of the chief defects of the Articles of Confederation, and a primary impetus for the Constitution: the nation's finances were out of order, and the government under the Articles lacked the ability to fix this. If, then, Congress has this general power over national finance, and if legislative power by its nature involves a measure of choice, then why may it not choose to organize national finance through a bank?

To all of this Hamilton adds the force of sheer practicality:

This restrictive interpretation of the word necessary is also contrary to this sound maxim of construction namely, that the powers contained in a constitution of government, especially those which concern the general administration of the affairs of a country ... ought to be construed liberally, in advancement of the public good. This rule does not depend on the particular form of a government or on the particular demarkation of the boundaries of its powers, but on the nature and objects of government itself. The means by which national exigencies are to be provided for, national inconveniencies obviated, national prosperity promoted, are of such infinite variety, extent and complexity, that there must, of necessity, be great latitude of discretion in the selection & application of those means. Hence consequently, the necessity & propriety of exercising the authorities intrusted to a government on principles of liberal construction.

Jefferson saw the federal government as a necessary evil, a thing whose trespasses upon the domain of the states was to be minimized. Hamilton on the other hand sees it an instrument for doing the public's business. And on that view, its powers must be flexible and capacious enough to do the public's business.

Accordingly, he puts little weight on the idea that the bank bill would contradict or overrule the laws of the states. Virtually all federal laws do this, he says, at least a little bit. Therefore, this simply cannot be the test of constitutionality; it cannot even really be a factor in evaluating the validity of a federal law. Hamilton does not expressly invoke the Supremacy Clause here, but of course that Clause plainly contemplates that federal laws can and will displace state laws.

What, then, of Jefferson's contention that there is no limit to federal power as Hamilton sees it? We have already seen why this is wrong, and what the limit is: Congress has this expansive power only "as to its specified powers & objects." And there likewise a "criterion of what is constitutional, and of what is not so":

If the end be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, & if the measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular provision of the constitution—it may safely be deemed to come within the compass of the national authority.

Remember this sentence: we're going to see a very similar one in McCulloch.

What remains of Hamilton's opinion is mostly an application of these principles to the particular facts of the Bank Bill. This is not really the important part, except as a demonstrative example of how we go about tracing the kinds of "relations" between means and ends that Hamilton has in mind. I encourage you to read through these passages (concentrated toward the end of the opinion), if only to get a sense of the style of reasoning. I don't have much to say about any of the particulars.

The dominant themes, viewed from the perspective of the legal theorist, are those we have already stressed. Hamilton envisions a number of scenarios in which a bank would be of great importance to the nation: it is his principle that expediency cannot be the test of constitutionality that makes these hypotheticals hold legal weight. For if a bank might be necessary in certain circumstances, but the powers of Congress are "uniform & invariable," then it must be the case that Congress has the power to charter a bank, today.

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