Welcome back to Constitutional Perspectives for the final installment of our module on the defining constitutional dispute of the early Republic: the question of implied powers. Today's lesson, though, is not actually about the question of implied powers. Instead, as a little coda to this module, I want to talk briefly about the second big constitutional dispute in American history, which was about the related but analytically distinct question of internal improvements.
What's that, you ask? Great question! The phrase refers, basically, to infrastructure projects ("improvements") contained entirely within a single state ("internal"). The question of constitutional law, however, is of slightly broader scope.
The very first clause of Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the power to
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States
Through the exercise of this taxing power, the federal government might happen to acquire significant sums of money. The question of internal improvements is this: can Congress direct that money to be spent however it pleases, or must all expenditures of federal monies be linked to one of the other enumerated powers of Congress?
You can see, perhaps, why we use the phrase "internal improvements" for this question. One of the most significant of the other powers of Congress is the Commerce Clause:
The Congress shall have power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
Infrastructure projects that span multiple states can be understood as an exercise of this power. But a project wholly within a single state cannot – or at least, so they thought in the early days. Therefore, if spending must be linked to some enumerated power, Congress cannot spend money on internal improvements. These were, instead, the province of the states – or at least, so thought the "strict constructionists." Thus the most famous infrastructure project of the age, the Erie Canal, was financed by the state of New York, not by Congress.
Unlike the question of implied powers, this one never came before the Supreme Court. It would have been difficult for it to do so, because federal spending doesn't generally give rise to any kind of cause of action through which someone might challenge the program. This was particularly true in the nineteenth century, when constitutional litigation mostly took the form of private disputes, often over money. The question of implied powers only found its way to the Court, recall, because of a dispute about James McCulloch's tax bill. And, in general, the government spending money on something doesn't infringe anyone else's legally protected interests. (In modern parlance, we would say that no one else has "standing" to sue, because they aren't "harmed" by the spending.)
The way the question came up, instead, was that Congress would pass a bill funding some internal improvement project and the president would veto it. This happened a few times. First, James Madison vetoed the so-called Bonus Bill of 1817, which would have directed the surplus from the national bank to be spent on assorted infrastructure projects. Five years later, James Monroe vetoed a bill for the repair of the Cumberland Road, one of the earliest major highways in America. Finally, Andrew Jackson vetoed a couple of internal improvements bills around 1830. Notably, both Madison and Monroe indicate in their veto messages that they wished internal improvement spending were lawful; Monroe quite expressly calls for a constitutional amendment to that effect. But, they said, the Constitution of 1789 simply did not provide for such a power, and therefore no matter how much they might like the policy, they were obliged to veto the legislation.
Needless to say, this position has not stood the test of time. Today, we accept, basically as a matter of course, that Congress can just spend money on stuff, broadly without restriction. (Other than the affirmative restrictions of e.g. the Bill of Rights, of course: it cannot spend money on a national church, because of the Establishment Clause.) As with the McCulloch question, this one covers a huge chunk of the stuff our federal government does. The federal government funds tons of infrastructure projects, for starters, and makes no clear distinction between those within a single state from those crossing state lines. But then you also have something like NASA, a classic example of "spending money doing cool shit." For that matter, this is also what, like, Medicare and Social Security are. The government has money: it gives it to people.
Although this issue is analytically distinct from the question of implied powers as such, we did see a glimmer of it in Hamilton and Jefferson's argument over the Bank Bill. Jefferson, in his opinion, considers the Taxing Clause as one of the two "general phrases" in Article I, Section 8 which might potentially (but, he says, do not) authorize the Bank. This might seem a bit strange, for we are accustomed to the idea that this Clause is just a power to tax. But this is exactly Jefferson's point. He is apparently contemplating a reading on which the two halves of the Clause are independent: a power to tax, and then, separately, a power to provide for the general welfare. The latter would just be a grant of general legislative authority, much as is found in the state constitutions.
This, as Jefferson notes, would make the rest of Article I, Section 8 redundant. Instead, therefore, we can only understand the language about common defense and general welfare as specifying the purpose toward which the power to tax must be exercised. It is, in that sense, a limitation on the taxing power: taxes may only be levied for these purposes, providing for the common defense and the general welfare of the nation. And, conversely, taxation is the only means through which Congress may pursue these ends (at least, so far as this one clause is concerned).
Of course he is plainly right about this: no one, to my knowledge, has ever seriously tried to advance the alternate reading. And Jefferson's point, that the taxing power is limited to certain purposes, does not answer the question about internal improvements. It certainly tells us that federal monies may only be spent on the general welfare. But this is not coextensive with the rest of Congress's enumerated powers. Indeed, the whole point is that Congress does not have full legislative authority to advance the general welfare.
Conversely, I do not read the Clause as itself authorizing Congress to spend money to advance the general welfare in any way it might please. People sometimes refer to it as the Taxing and Spending Clause these days, but this, I think, is not correct. It confers only a power to tax. Now, it clearly contemplates that the monies raised through these taxes will be spent, and spent in the national interest. But the actual text of the Clause does not say anything about spending. Its language is not inconsistent with a rule that Congress can only spend money in the exercise of its other powers.
Now Hamilton, in his opinion, alludes to a different part of the Constitution that might be thought to authorize spending money as such: Article IV, Section Three, Clause Two, which gives Congress the power to "dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." Now, we think of this clause as pertaining to the governance of the territories. It is located in Article IV, which is all about states and territories. The previous clause governs the admission of new states to the Union. Everything about the context tells us that this provision is about the territories. We literally call it the Territories Clause.
But the text says something different. In fact, it is pretty unambiguous about this! It speaks, in so many words, about "Territory or other property." And Hamilton insists that this must include money raised through taxation, as much as any other kind of property. Attorney General Edmund Randolph had denied this, in his opinion, on the grounds that "[t]he disposal and regulation of money is the final cause for raising it by taxes." I confess I do not quite understand what Randolph meant by this (he literally doesn't elaborate beyond what I have quoted).
Now, Hamilton's interest in this point was its relation to the Bank. He thought the Bank a suitable means by which Congress might provide for the disposition of federal property, i.e. monies, including those raised through taxation. But note that, if he is right about what this provision of Article IV means, that does just answer the question of internal improvements, and in so many words. If the "other property" of the nation includes all the money in the Treasury, then, well, Congress is given an explicit power to dispose of it! Meaning, presumably, to dispose of it however it sees fit, to spend it on whatever it might want.
I don't really think this is what the drafters of this clause had in mind. As I said a moment ago, the whole context surrounding the Clause is about territories, the federal union, etc. But even just considering Hamilton's claim can help us see the whole matter in a different light. If spending federal monies is a matter of disposing of property belonging to the United States, then it is hardly surprising that there is no express provision for it. For all who own property have the right, the power to dispose of it. Hamilton, in discussing the Bank Bill and the question of implied powers, makes a great deal of the sovereign character of the federal government, within the scope of its authority. But here we do not even need to go that far! The relevant characteristic is not sovereignty, but just ownership.
Of course, in the Lockean political theory, these are not really so different. To say that a person is sovereign over their own body, for instance, is to say that their body is their property. For Locke, the quality that allows us to acquire ownership of things in the external world is the same quality that makes us sovereign over ourselves. And, as Lockean theory had evolved by the American Founding, our property in ourselves had come to be seen as unalienable, meaning that we cannot dispose of it, cannot give it away. But this is rather the exception! Most of our property interests are alienable; this is very much the default.
This being the case, then, we might see it as entirely natural that the federal government would have a power to dispose of its own property. The only question would be which organ of the government has that power. And the answer to this question can only be Congress. We can see this in the structure of Lockean contract theory: disposing of one's property is part of the legislative power that every individual has in the state of nature. We can also see it in, for instance, the Appropriations Clause. We know, without any question, that money cannot be spent unless Congress approves it. Therefore, if a general power to dispose of federal monies exists, it can only possibly belong to Congress. The Territories Clause, read as Hamilton wants to read it, would then be nothing more than an express confirmation of something that must have been true in any case.
The Jeffersonian counter is, of course, that a general power to dispose of federal property, i.e. federal monies, as Congress sees fit would utterly destroy the scheme of enumerated powers. (The Jeffersonians are always saying this, you may have noticed.) Moreover, allowing the government to spend outside the scope of its enumerated powers will lead to far more onerous taxation of the citizenry. And, you know, they're not wrong! What the Jeffersonians might have feared from allowing internal improvement spending has, in fact, come to pass. The federal budget is massively higher now than in Jefferson's day, and the majority of that money is spent on things outside of the enumerated powers.
The Hamiltonian counter to which is... so what?? Yes, the federal budget is huge now. Because the American People have, through their representatives, chosen to raise taxes on themselves, and spend it on useful things. This, indeed, is part of the essential function of government: just as the individual has a natural power to dispose of their property in the state of nature, through civil government we make collective choices about how to dispose of (a significant share of) our property. The rule is "no taxation without representation;" taxes imposed by our elected representatives are entirely proper.
Moreover, if it was ever to be doubted whether the federal government was meant to be an instrument for this kind of collective choice about the disposition of resources, the Sixteenth Amendment, which expressly authorized income taxes, must have put an end to that doubt. (So too does it answer the question of whether the "general welfare" is advanced by a scheme of wealth redistribution, something that probably would have been doubted at the Founding. The Amendment specifically overturned a decision saying Congress could not practically tax income from land, an income source peculiar to the rich. Hence the language about "from whatever source derived." The approval of redistributive taxes could hardly be more plain.)
"But this spending is beyond Congress's powers under the Constitution!" No it isn't. This is the same analytical error that we saw in the context of the implied powers question. Congress has all those powers which the Constitution, as a whole, is fairly read as conferring upon it, whether expressly or implicitly. If this includes a power of disposing of federal monies, then spending those monies on highways and spaceships and Medicare is constitutional. The fact that this spending does not relate to anything in the second through seventeenth clauses of Article I, Section 8 is immaterial.
Nor does a broad spending power amount to a general legislative power, negating the whole scheme of enumeration. General legislative power means general regulatory authority. It means coercion: the power to tell people what to do. A general spending power does not involve any of this. It is not coercive – except in that monies are raised through taxation, but Congress does have a general taxing power, explicitly, and confirmed by amendment. In any event, the money in the Treasury will not always have been procured through taxation. The Bonus Bill Madison vetoed would have spent a dividend from the national bank.
Of course federal spending is a source of enormous practical power. By imposing conditions on the granting of federal funds, Congress is able to induce its preferred behavior from private parties in a great many cases. And, because the Jeffersonian position on internal improvements has long since been rejected, this power to induce behavior through spending money is functionally unlimited. It thus augments Congress's actual regulatory authority, and quite substantially.
But, well, if the Jeffersonians hoped to deny that the new federal government was enormously powerful, they were deluding themselves. We have seen, throughout this module, how again and again they had to strain their reading of the Constitution to avoid that implication. Because... that is the plain implication of the Constitution, naturally read. The thing it creates is enormously powerful, as indeed the national government of the United States of America could hardly fail to be.


