Welcome back to Constitutional Perspectives!
We're in the endgame falling action now. Last time, I examined John Marshall's discussion of the first question in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819): the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States. This was the authoritative resolution of the question of implied powers, and therefore may be thought of as the climax of our story. The rest of this module is, in narrative terms, falling action: it is what happens after the fateful decision has been made.
This falling action begins in McCulloch itself. Whether the Bank was constitutional was only the first question, after all: the second question is whether Maryland had the right to tax its operations. This question is only interesting on the assumption that the Bank is constitutional: if the first question had been resolved differently, then it would have been academic to conclude that Mr. McCulloch did indeed owe that tax payment. To modern ears, it might also sound academic to conclude that he didn't owe the tax, given that the Bank had been upheld. But this is only because we live in the world McCulloch created.
Marshall's basic argument for why Maryland cannot tax the Bank is extremely simple. Although technically the rule is not stated explicitly in the Constitution, he says, it follows immediately from a principle that is made explicit: federal supremacy. Article VI states that
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
It is really easy to see this as directly forbidding Maryland's tax. But that is not quite right. In the ordinary Supremacy Clause case, you have state and federal laws that directly contradict one another. A good example is all the state laws, and state constitutional provisions, in the Southern states providing for racial segregation. After Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the federal Constitution was understood to forbid the practice, but the state provisions (largely) stayed on the books for decades thereafter. But they could not be given effect: the Supremacy Clause obliged state judges to apply the Fourteenth Amendment in preference to these state segregation laws. It was, of course, impossible to do both.
Plausibly, however, this was not true in McCulloch. Maryland hadn't made it illegal for the Bank to operate within its borders, only imposed a tax on those operations. We might think, then, that the tax does not fall afoul of the Supremacy Clause, for it is possible to respect the federal law and also the state law. This seems to have been Maryland's position, more or less: Marshall tells us that they argued "not that the States may directly resist a law of Congress, but that they may exercise their acknowledged powers upon it."
His analysis is basically devoted to explaining why this is not so.
He begins with what he calls "corollaries" of the great axiom that is the Supremacy Clause:
1st. That a power to create implies a power to preserve;
2d. That a power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and incompatible with these powers to create and to preserve;
3d. That, where this repugnancy exists, that authority which is supreme must control, not yield to that over which it is supreme.
That Congress has the power to create the Bank was the first holding in the case; this implies that it also has the power to preserve it. The second and third corollaries, then, imply that the states cannot be allowed to possess the power of destroying the Bank. And now we are teed up for the proposition for which this portion of the opinion is remembered: that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy."
In the ordinary case, of course, where the government's interest is in raising revenue, the goal is very much not to destroy the thing being taxed. We impose a sales tax, and the hope is very much not to destroy the phenomenon of people buying and selling stuff. That would frustrate the entire purpose of the exercise. But taxes can be used for destruction: you just have to make the tax high enough. Any kind of economic transaction has a certain profit margin. If you impose a tax significantly greater than this, then you make the transaction unprofitable, and it will not happen. You do this not to raise revenue, of course, but because you want that kind of transaction to stop happening. These are so-called "regulatory" taxes.
When Marshall says that the power to tax involves the power to destroy, then, what he is saying is that, if Maryland can impose a modest tax on the operations of the Bank, it could also impose a crippling tax upon them, a tax which made it no longer feasible for those operations to continue. Moreover, he says, there is no reason why the power of states to tax federal instruments could or should be limited to the Bank. If the states can tax the Bank, then they "may tax the mail; they may tax the mint; they may tax patent rights; they may tax the papers of the custom house; they may tax judicial process; they may tax all the means employed by the Government to an excess which would defeat all the ends of Government." The whole effect, in Marshall's view, would be to transfer supremacy from the federal government to the states.
Now in theory, you could imagine taking another approach here. A century later, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes would famously suggest just such an approach. To Marshall's observation that the power to tax involves the power to destroy, Holmes responded, "Not while this Court sits." The notion is that, if a state were to impose a tax sufficiently arduous as to destroy the federal instrument in question, then a court, perhaps the Supreme Court, would strike that down. Because this safeguard exists, then, there is no need to exempt federal instruments wholly from state taxes.
Marshall, however, thought the question of "what degree of taxation is the legitimate use and what degree may amount to the abuse of the power" a "perplexing inquiry ... unfit for the judicial department." As in the first question, Marshall is taking a categorical view of things: the power either exists or it doesn't. The role of the judiciary is not to pass upon the wisdom of a measure, only the lawfulness. And as Hamilton told us, expediency can never be the measure of legality. Marshall would say to Holmes that, if the courts would sustain a modest tax, then they have no business invalidating a crippling one, for the two involve the exercise of the very same power.
Of course Maryland argued something closer to Holmes's view. Yes, in theory, they acknowledged (as they must), the power to tax could be used to destroy. But it would be, well, impolite to presume that it ever would be so used.
Taxation, it is said, does not necessarily and unavoidably destroy. To carry it to the excess of destruction would be an abuse, to presume which would banish that confidence which is essential to all Government.
Much of Marshall's argument, then, is dedicated to showing why this "confidence" is misplaced, why it does not apply here. The fundamental problem is that Maryland's tax is an example of the part acting upon the whole. The people of one state, Marshall says, would not "trust those of another with a power to control the most insignificant operations of their State Government."
Why, then, should we suppose that the people of any one State should be willing to trust those of another with a power to control the operations of a Government to which they have confided their most important and most valuable interests?
Confidence in government, Marshall says, is derived from specific mechanisms. The "security against the abuse of ... power is found in the structure of the Government itself." In the ordinary case, "the legislature acts upon its constituents." This is why we can trust legislatures not to abuse their powers, why it is okay to grant them such broad powers. The "interest of the legislator" and the "influence of the constituent over their representative" will guard against the abuse of power. But these mechanisms simply do not apply where one state acts upon an instrument of the general government:
In the Legislature of the Union alone are all represented. The Legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the people with the power of controlling measures which concern all, in the confidence that it will not be abused. This, then, is not a case of confidence, and we must consider it is as it really is.
This is why, Marshall says, the federal government may tax the operations of state banks, but not vice-versa:
The people of all the States have created the General Government, and have conferred upon it the general power of taxation. The people of all the States, and the States themselves, are represented in Congress, and, by their representatives, exercise this power. When they tax the chartered institutions of the States, they tax their constituents, and these taxes must be uniform. But when a State taxes the operations of the Government of the United States, it acts upon institutions created not by their own constituents, but by people over whom they claim no control. It acts upon the measures of a Government created by others as well as themselves, for the benefit of others in common with themselves. The difference is that which always exists, and always must exist, between the action of the whole on a part, and the action of a part on the whole — between the laws of a Government declared to be supreme, and those of a Government which, when in opposition to those laws, is not supreme.
In this sense, then, the problem with the tax is that it is undemocratic. By taxing the Bank, Maryland acts upon the people of every state. But those people had no role in formulating the tax, because they cannot vote for Maryland state legislators. It is, in other words, a case of taxation without representation. And although Marshall does not really develop this point, note that this objection applies even to a modest tax, far short of the level that would "destroy" the Bank. Maryland, after all, has no power to tax the people of the other states of the Union, no matter how modestly.
This is the main argument on the second question, the one we remember. But Marshall develops a whole second argument as well, one that supports his categorical view of the matter. The argument developed above suggests that Maryland's power to tax is limited by the federal Constitution, by principles of federal supremacy. But this assumes that, in some sense, it had that power to begin with, and could have exercised it but for the interference of federal law.
Marshall doubts that this is so. His argument is rooted in the principles of social contract theory. Like all government powers, he says, the power to tax comes originally from the People. They "give to their Government a right of taxing themselves and their property." Really, it is nothing more than an aggregation of the power that every individual has to dispose of their own property. But,
The means employed by the Government of the Union ... are not given by the people of a particular State, not given by the constituents of the legislature which claim the right to tax them, but by the people of all the States. They are given by all, for the benefit of all — and, upon theory, should be subjected to that Government only which belongs to all.
The problem, then, is that the Bank of the United States never belonged to the People of Maryland. It is not their property, and therefore they have no right to dispose of it, whether as individuals or as a collective body politic. In a way, this is just restating the "no taxation without representation" point. But the conclusion is not only that Maryland cannot be trusted to tax those whom it does not represent, but that it fundamentally has no right to do so. It is simply not sovereign over the Bank:
The sovereignty of a State extends to everything which exists by its own authority or is introduced by its permission, but does it extend to those means which are employed by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the United States? We think it demonstrable that it does not. Those powers are not given by the people of a single State. They are given by the people of the United States, to a Government whose laws, made in pursuance of the Constitution, are declared to be supreme. Consequently, the people of a single State cannot confer a sovereignty which will extend over them.
This, Marshall says, gives us "a principle which is safe for the States and safe for the Union," one that avoids the spectacle of "clashing sovereignty." It also shows why Holmes's impulse to differentiate between acceptable and excessive taxes is wrong. For any "attempt to use [the power of taxation] on the means employed by the Government of the Union, in pursuance of the Constitution, is itself an abuse because it is the usurpation of a power which the people of a single State cannot give."
He does not put the whole weight of the decision on this argument, though. Having developed it, he immediately "resume[s] the inquiry" having "waiv[ed] this theory for the present," and returns to the matter of federal supremacy, confidence, etc. Why, though? If "measur[ing] the power of taxation residing in a State by the extent of sovereignty which the people of a single State possess and can confer on its Government" had given such a satisfactory rule, why not simply let that rule decide the case?
I do not know what he was thinking, of course. But I do know that this whole style of reasoning is really not in vogue in our time. Indeed, it has not been in fashion since the early Republic. It has the disreputable stink of "natural law" about it, of legal propositions derived from Reason rather than from any human enactment. Having evolved beyond the use of natural law, we today are inclined to find our legal rules in the text. The Tenth Amendment says that all powers not forbidden to the states are reserved. As a matter of federal law, then, there are no limits on state powers, except those imposed by the Constitution. A federal court has no basis striking down a state law unless that law violates some provision of the federal Constitution. In this case, that provision is the Supremacy Clause.
But that isn't really right. It isn't really how we should view McCulloch. Much of the previous lesson was devoted to showing how the first question is not really "about" the Necessary and Proper Clause, viewed as an isolated provision. The same is true, I think, of the second question and the Supremacy Clause. I have already said that this is not a straightforward case of federal preemption, because the two laws were not in direct, logical conflict. So the case is not a literal application of the Supremacy Clause itself; it is instead about the broader principles of federal supremacy, of which the Clause is but a manifestation.
And I think one way we can view Marshall's argument about the original power of the states is as an explanation of the logic behind those principles. Why is the federal government made supreme? Well, because the Constitution says so, of course. But it is not an arbitrary dictate: the federal government is supreme because it is the creation of the whole People of the United States, whereas the states are the creation only of a part of that People. The whole People have rights that the People of a single state do not. The instrument of their sovereign will is naturally superior to the instruments of those smaller Peoples' wills.
Is Maryland's tax invalid because of the federal supremacy, then, or because the People of Maryland are simply not competent to tax the Bank to begin with? As Marshall shows us, we do not really have to choose. Both styles of reasoning lead to the same place; both can, in a sense, be seen as ways of saying the same thing.


