To kick things off here in Level Two, I want to talk a bit about history. I began Level One the same way, giving a quick sketch of the path from the Declaration of Independence in 1776 to the adoption of the Constitution in 1789. But the world did not actually begin in 1776. The American Constitution grew out of the British constitutional tradition, and that goes back many centuries. And so today I want to talk about what we might call constitutional prehistory: the history of the American constitutional order before America even existed.
We don't typically teach this material in our constitutional law courses. I myself only learned of it some several years after I graduated law school. But I do think, first of all, that it is very interesting stuff, and also that it has a very real relevance for understanding the Constitution. Not in any very specific or direct way; I just think it helps broaden our understanding of what the Constitution is all about.
I want to mention that much of what I know about this history comes from this article by legal historian Barbara Black... a.k.a. my grandmother. Who, as it happens, died two weeks ago today. I cannot help but be mindful of her as I write about colonial legal history – her specialty. And I highly recommend her New York Times obituary to all my readers.
Okay, so when should our story begin, if not 1776?
Well, how about 1606, when King James I of England issued the first charter of the Virginia Company? This was the group that, the following year, would found the first (successful) British settlement in North America, called Jamestown in honor of their king. That outpost would go on to become the Colony, and eventually the Commonwealth, of Virginia. And in that first charter, James promised, speaking on behalf not only of himself but also his "heirs, and successors," that the people who settled the Virginia colony, and their descendants, would "have and enjoy all liberties, franchises, and immunities, within any of our other dominions, to all intents and purposes, as if they had been abiding and born, within this our realm of England, or any other of our said dominions." This is colloquially summarized as having guaranteed to the Virginia colonists the "rights of Englishmen." And it is from this guarantee – repeated in similar terms in the founding charters of the other colonies of British North America – that the American conception of the British imperial constitution derived.
Ah, but what were the "rights of Englishmen"? To answer that we have to go back further still. All the way back, really, to 1066 and the Norman Conquest.
The thing about Britain, you see, is that it's an island. And although the English channel is quite narrow, it has proven extremely difficult for would-be conquerors from the European continent to cross in force. The Nazis couldn't do it. The Spanish Armada couldn't do it. In the whole last thousand years, a foreign conquest of Britain has only ever happened once. In 1066, Edward the Confessor died childless, sending the British monarchy into a measure of disarray. Edward's brother-in-law Harold inherited the throne. But William, Duke of Normandy – Edward's first cousin once removed – had other ideas, and landed his forces at Sussex while Harold was distracted fending off an assault from Norway. William and Harold fought at the Battle of Hastings, and William prevailed, killing Harold along the way and becoming himself King of England.
But despite William's family ties with Edward, his Conquest introduced a certain amount of tension. He was foreign – a Norman, a Frenchman – and had brought many other Normans with him to constitute a new ruling class. The existing Anglo-Saxon populace was... less than thrilled about this. William had to work to keep the peace, and get the English to accept him. One of the ways he did this was by promising at his coronation to honor existing English law and custom.
England already had a whole set of governing institutions. Indeed, it had possibly the finest system of government and administration of anywhere on earth at the time. This system included a number of local bodies – shire courts and the like – but also a set of institutions orbiting the Crown itself. The Anglo-Saxon kings had been in the habit of summoning the "witan" (or wise men) of the realm to advise them on matters of state – and in particular on legislation. This practice actually went back even before Alfred the Great became the first king of the whole of England in 886 (having previously been king only of Wessex). William inherited this tradition after the Conquest, and, in the manner of a Continental, started slapping Latin terminology on it. The group of advisors who attended the king full-time became the curia regis, or "king's court," while the larger assemblages of nobles and clergy summoned on particular occasions became the Magnum Concilium, or "Great Council."
These Anglo-Norman institutions continued to evolve during the century or so after William's Conquest, with Henry II (r. 1154-1189) remembered in particular as a great jurist and innovator. But Henry's reforms tended to enlarge the power of the Crown at the expense of the nobility. And these tensions began to boil over during the reign of his son John (r. 1199-1216). In 1214, John's military campaigns in France ended in disaster, and the Crown lost most of its French holdings. The following year, the barons essentially revolted, and forced John to sign a charter guaranteeing them various rights and privileges. We call this the Magna Carta, or "Great Charter," and remember it especially as the origin of our modern Due Process Clauses.
But it also guaranteed that the king would not impose new taxes without the consent of the realm – specifically, of the bishops, earls, and barons. (Clauses 12 & 14.) This promise effectively transformed the Angl0-Norman Great Council into what we now know as Parliament. By the end of the thirteenth century, the composition of Parliament was expanded to include elected representatives of the common folk – the House of Commons, as we now know it, in contrast to the original House of Lords.
This was basically the governing structure of England as it stood in 1606, at the time of the Virginia charter. The Crown governed the realm by and through the advice of its advisory council, to wit, a representative assembly of the realm itself. In particular, the King could only levy (certain kinds of) taxes with the consent of this assembly. Given the need for funds, this gave Parliament a very real say in the government of the realm, even though in theory they were still merely an advisory council to an absolute monarch. When a Parliament would be summoned – typically because the King needed more money – it would propose some new acts of legislation. And although the King could veto these proposals, the dependence on Parliament for funding meant that he could not afford to alienate Parliament too much.
The "rights of Englishmen" that had been guaranteed to the Virginia colonists, then, meant... basically all of this. That they had the right to participate in the government of their realm (i.e. Virginia) in just the same way that the Englishmen in England had the right to participate in the government of theirs. That's what the colonists thought, anyway. In 1619, Governor George Yeardley summoned a representative assembly composed mostly of representatives elected by the colonists. This became known as the House of Burgesses, and the people of Virginia thought that it stood in a similar relation to them, and to the Crown, as the English Parliament at Westminster did. The other colonies of British North America all had similar assemblies, and viewed them in a similar light.
But here's the thing. The British government itself never actually acknowledged this claim of right by the colonists. As far as London was concerned, the colonies were pure corporate constructs. They were, in essence, playthings of the Crown. It was nice, it was adorable, even, that the colonists were so proud of their English heritage that they wanted to make little models of English institutions. But their "representative assemblies" were not the same thing as the Westminster Parliament, no sir. They existed only at the sufferance of the Crown, which could have swept them aside and governed its colonial possessions directly if it had wanted.
From the beginning, then, London and America had two very different views of the nature of the empire. But for a long time, this difference of opinion didn't matter much. London was, in practice, perfectly happy to let the colonies have their little dollhouse assemblies (as it saw them). So the colonies never really had occasion to press their claim of right. A series of British "Navigation Acts" in the second half of the seventeenth century had regulated, well, navigation, shipping, trade, etc., and the colonies had acquiesced in this, reasoning that someone had to addresses these matters that were not contained within any one realm. But they claimed the right to govern their own "internal affairs," and this claim was, for the most part, not interfered with. You may, if you took a course in American history in high school, have heard the term "salutary neglect," the policy by which England mostly left the colonies to their own devices. That policy prevailed well into the eighteenth century, particularly under the ministry of Sir Robert Walpole, who was what we now regard as the first British Prime Minister from 1721 to 1742.
But in the mid-eighteenth century, this started to change. Mostly this was at the behest of the colonial officials in America, the royal governors and such. These men were sick and tired of having their authority disrespected by these unruly colonists, who believed themselves entitled to self-government and thumbed their noses at the power of the Crown. Throughout the 1740s and '50s, these colonial officials kept pestering and petitioning the government in London to help them bring the colonists to heel. They didn't get much traction, at first: London still just didn't see America as very important. But by about 1755, London was starting to listen. The colonists really were growing unruly. At the Albany Congress in 1754, a fellow by the name of Benjamin Franklin had been proposing that the various colonies join together in a unified system of government!
Alas, also in 1754 a young idiot serving in the British colonial military – his name was George Washington, you may have heard of him – blundered into a disastrous engagement with a French fort near what is now Pittsburgh. This began what became known as the Seven Years' War – sometimes considered the first world war. It kicked off in earnest in 1756, and it rather occupied the attention of the British government for, well, seven years, until finally ended by the Treaty of Paris. (Well, a Treaty of Paris, I should say: there have been a lot of them, including the one twenty years later that ended the American War of Independence.)
So, in 1763, the British government was finally able to turn its attention to the problem of the unruly colonies. George Grenville became Prime Minister (his predecessor having been chased from office by criticism of the Treaty of Paris), and his first order of business was reasserting imperial power over the colonies in America. It did this by passing a series of laws concerning the taxation of various goods in the colonies: the Sugar Act 1764 and the Stamp Act 1765.
Now, there is an important point here that often gets lost. These laws are often viewed as having been revenue measures. Britain, so the story goes, had incurred great expense during the war, and sought to raise some of that money by taxing the colonies. This is basically false. The Sugar Act had reduced the tax on molasses. The primary goal of this campaign of legislation was simply to assert the principle of imperial, and in particular parliamentary, control over the colonies. They were specifically designed to attack those spaces in which the colonies claimed an exclusive right of self-government, to press London's claims outside the traditional area of navigation. They were, in that regard, nothing more than the expression of what had been London's view of things since the very beginning: that the colonies were mere possessions of the British empire, fully subject to the authority of the British government.
The sequence that led from the Stamp Act to the Revolution is pretty well known. The colonies erupted in protest. They saw the Act as contrary to the principle of "no taxation without representation," which you'll note can be traced to Magna Carta (though it did not actually encompass electoral representation until the development of the House of Commons about a century thereafter). This eventually prompted Parliament, in 1766, to repeal the Stamp Act to calm things down. But at the same time it passed a Declaratory Act, which asserted Parliament's power to legislate for the colonies "in all cases whatsoever."
Still, things did calm down... briefly. Then came the Townshend Acts 1767, a new package of provocative legislation meant to press Britain's side of the constitutional controversy. After years of unrest in America, these Acts were largely repealed in 1770, with only the tax on tea kept as a symbolic assertion of Parliament's power. Again, the colonies were basically mollified. But then the Tea Act 1773 exempted the British East India Company from this tea tax – again, note how this is not a revenue measure, and the objection from the colonists was not that they were being made to pay too much. This kicked things off in earnest: the Boston Tea Party in late 1773, the Intolerable Acts (known in Britain as "Coercive Acts") 1774, the formation of the Continental Congress in 1774, a brief attempt at reconciliation in 1775, and then the onset of the war itself at the Battle of Lexington and Concord in April of that year.
People love to debate the motivations for the American Revolution. Was it, as it is taught to our children, fought in glorious defense of liberty and democracy? Was it fought to protect slavery, in the wake of the 1772 decision in Somerset's Case? Was it perhaps orchestrated by the economic elite, as the Beard school teaches? I think all of this misses the point. The Americans did not start the war! Rather, the sequence of events from 1763 through to 1775 is clearly one of British aggression. The two sides had never agreed on the nature of the empire, and it was Britain that decided to press its view of things with force.
We can also see, from considering the constitutional dimensions of the conflict, why reconciliation was impossible; why, perhaps, the war was simply inevitable. The key point is that the British could not possibly have accepted the American theory of the empire. Why? Well, in telling the above story, I kind of glossed over what was happening in Britain from 1606 through to 1763. But that was a pretty dramatic period in British history! The American theory of the empire made a fair amount of sense in 1606. But by the mid-18th century, changes in the British domestic constitution meant that London was absolutely unable to acquiesce in the American view of things.
The American theory of the empire revolved centrally around the Crown. Virginia was a dominion of the Crown, on this view, just as England was. Medieval monarchs often had multiple dominions or possessions in this way. Indeed, King James I of England was also, famously, King James VI of Scotland. At the time, these were separate kingdoms, both of which happened to be ruled by the same man. And just as James was the only link between the kingdoms of England and Scotland, so too was he the only link between England and Virginia. Each realm, then, had its own domestic constitution within this overarching imperial structure. And the American view was that the dominion of Virginia had the same sort of constitution that the dominion of England had, with the King obliged to operate by and through representative institutions of each dominion.
This made a lot of sense in 1606. But the century that followed was, among other things, disastrous for the British monarchy. James's son Charles had a tumultuous reign marked by constant conflict with Parliament, culminating in the English Civil War and ultimately Charles's beheading in 1649. Although the monarchy was restored in 1660, the relationship between Crown and Parliament had been forever altered. In its ancestral origin, Parliament existed at the will of the Crown; it was, formally, little more than an advisory council. But it was Parliament that invited Charles II to assume the throne in 1660. Charles, and especially his son James II, resisted the implication for some thirty years.
But the Glorious Revolution of 1688 put an end to that, deposing James in favor of William of Orange and establishing the principle of parliamentary supremacy for good. Sovereignty, in the post-1688 order, was seen as residing not with the King alone, but with the King-in-Parliament. This made the idea of an empire tied together only through the person of the King kind of untenable. England was not just another dominion of the Crown: it was the people of England, through their representatives, who gave the monarchy its very existence. Rather than royal dominions, then, the colonies had to be creatures of Parliament, subject to its will as was the rest of England. (Not least because, if the colonies had only ever been royal possessions, then what had become of them during the Interregnum from 1649 to 1660, when there was no king??)
These changes also made the American idea that the King was supposed to protect and enforce the terms of the imperial constitution a total non-starter. In 1774, the Americans were appealing to King George III, to whom they still professed perfect loyalty, to protect them against the depredations of the Westminster Parliament. It was his job, as defender of the constitution, to veto the supposed acts of Parliament that were trampling the rights of the colonies. But the royal veto was, by this time, defunct. Formally, yes, George had the right to refuse his assent to legislation, as King Charles III has in our time. But practically, using that power would result in having his head cut off. This was the settlement of the Glorious Revolution.
What the Americans were asking for, then, was impossible, as a matter of the domestic constitution of Britain. And George was actually a good and conscientious constitutional monarch! He took his role in the domestic constitution very seriously, and would never have dreamed of opposing Parliament in this way. To the Americans, of course, this parsed as George supporting Parliament in its conflict with the colonies. (And, to be sure, the King certainly did support Parliament on the merits.) Thus, by 1776 they had concluded that they could no longer stay loyal to the Crown. You see all of this in the clause of the Declaration of Independence charging King George with having "combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation."
Now, there is a supreme irony in all this. Our Declaration is framed in terms of Lockean political theory, the rights of the People to govern themselves, etc. But it was precisely the adoption of those very ideas in Britain itself that made the conflict inevitable. John Locke himself was on the ships with William of Orange in 1688! His Treatises of Government were written largely as a justification for the Glorious Revolution. And, by the Walpole ministry in the 1720s, Locke's theories had become the more-or-less official theory of the British state. The philosophy of the Declaration's second paragraph was not actually in dispute between the two sides.
But if this is so, we might ask, how could London justify denying the rights of self-governance to the colonists? Why did Parliament not see that our cause was just? Well, one member of Parliament did: William Pitt. For the most part, Parliament insisted that it was the appropriate representative institution for the American colonies, through something called "virtual representation." Even though the Americans could not elect members of the Westminster Parliament, their interests were represented there, because uhhhh, because reasons, that's why. The same concept of virtual representation was used for centuries to justify denying women the right to vote, because you see, their husbands would "virtually represent" them. By analogy, I guess, the American colonies were like children.
Pitt thought this nonsense, as did the Americans. (Well, not the part about women's suffrage...) From their perspective, the imperial constitution as London seemed to see it was a grotesque monstrosity. They were being asked, so they saw it, to treat the parliament of a foreign country as their sovereign. Now, it made sense for multiple realms to be tied together through a single monarch. But it made no sense to say that one realm – really, the people thereof – was sovereign over another. This would be akin, they thought, to a condition of slavery. And, setting aside the bitter irony, they weren't wrong! Parliament, itself an instrument of popular self-government, was asking the Americans to abandon any claim that they were entitled to govern themselves – a claim that they had maintained steadily since the very origins of British North America. And, increasingly, London was willing to press this demand with force. What, exactly, were the Americans meant to do if not fight back?
Probably the only man who really understood all of this at the time was Franklin. You'll recall that he was advocating colonial union all the way back in 1754, long before the notion had occurred to anyone else. He then spent the next twenty years shuttling back and forth across the Atlantic, trying desperately to forestall the conflict. He saw that the future of the British empire lay in America, not least because America is so much bigger than the British isles and could therefore support a much greater population. He thought it would be a disastrous mistake for Britain to lose its American holdings. And he knew that it would have to lose them, if it did not change its position on the constitutional question.
Franklin also saw that the standard American ask in the run-up to the war – seats in the Westminster Parliament – made no sense. That parliament was bound to the realm of England – or, in the wake of the 1707 Act of Union with Scotland, of Great Britain – and could have no just authority outside it. Instead, Franklin wanted to create a whole new institution, an imperial parliament, with representation for each of the realms of the empire. This imperial parliament would be superior to each realm's local assemblies, the Parliament at Westminster being no different in this regard than the Virginia House of Burgesses.
There is a lot to like about this idea: Franklin was, essentially, taking the American, 1606-vintage model of the empire and replacing the Crown with a representative body. This seems an eminently logical approach if the principles of the Glorious Revolution, of Locke's Second Treatise, were to be applied uniformly throughout the system. And in light of what the British Empire became in the nineteenth century, it makes for a fascinating "what if?" alternate history, to imagine the world if Franklin had gotten his way. Would, say, India have been folded into this imperial parliament as an equal? Might this have become a kind of world government?
Alas, London wouldn't listen; they had no interest in letting the center of power move away from Westminster. But Franklin was right about the future lying in America. And although it took a couple of centuries, the loss of the colonies did ultimately knock Britain from its perch as the global hegemon. In yet another irony, in the aftermath of World War Two the British Empire transformed into the Commonwealth, a loose association of independent nations – formerly British colonial possessions – held together only in that they share a common monarch. You might recognize in this arrangement the American theory of empire from 1606. History's a funny thing.


