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The Question of Implied Powers, Part V: McCulloch v. Maryland, the First Question

Welcome back to Constitutional Perspectives!

Last time, I had just set the scene for the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819). This, you will recall, was a dispute about whether James McCulloch, the manager of the Baltimore branch of the Second Bank of the United States, had to pay a tax that the state of Maryland had assessed on the operation of the Bank. This dispute found its way to the United States Supreme Court, and thereby to the desk of one Chief Justice John Marshall, the last significant Federalist office-holder and a disciple of Alexander Hamilton's. The case raised two major constitutional questions, the first of which is just the same question we have been considering throughout this module: the question of implied powers.

Marshall's opinion, as I noted last time, begins by observing that this question has arisen before:

The principle now contested was introduced at a very early period of our history, has been recognised by many successive legislatures, and has been acted upon by the Judicial Department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of undoubted obligation.

This is not just setting the scene. It matters, Marshall says, that this is not "an open question entirely unprejudiced by the former proceedings of the Nation respecting it" (or what we might now call a "case of first impression"). We should be, he suggests, exceedingly reluctant to conclude that all those great minds who had grappled with this question in the past got it wrong. To be sure, a "bold and daring usurpation might be resisted after an acquiescence still longer and more complete than this." But, he says,

[I]t is conceived that a doubtful question, one on which human reason may pause and the human judgment be suspended, ... if not put at rest by the practice of the Government, ought to receive a considerable impression from that practice.

I have to imagine this must be one of the first invocations of the principle of stare decisis – the idea that a prior decision ought to be let stand, even if we might have decided the question differently in a vacuum – in the history of American constitutional law. There simply had not been that much time for very many issues to be litigated more than once.

There are a couple of interesting features here, though, that merit further remark. First, we usually think of stare decisis as something that applies to judicial decisions. But here, Marshall is talking mostly about the weight of prior decisions by Congress and by President Washington. He is taking Cabinet Battle #1, and for that matter Madison's unsuccessful fight against the Bank Bill in the House of Representatives, seriously as moments of constitutional adjudication.

Second, this is not just an appeal to stare decisis. Marshall puts particular emphasis on the fact that Madison, who had literally led the fight against the Bank in 1791, had changed his mind as president. That "a short experience of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive [the Bank] exposed the Government convinced those who were most prejudiced against the measure of its necessity." The key word being that last one: necessity. Even on a broad construction, there must be some practical relationship between the means Congress employs and its enumerated powers. That Madison himself had been convinced of the Bank's necessity is, therefore, itself weighty evidence as to the merits of the case.

First, though, Marshall has to establish the law that will apply to the case. He begins his discussion of the law by noting that

[T]he counsel for the State of Maryland have deemed it of some importance, in the construction of the Constitution, to consider that instrument not as emanating from the people, but as the act of sovereign and independent States. The powers of the General Government, it has been said, are delegated by the States, who alone are truly sovereign, and must be exercised in subordination to the States, who alone possess supreme dominion.

This question will be the subject of the second module of Level Two: the nature of the Union. I do not want, therefore, to say too much about why Marshall rejects Maryland's contention just yet, or why he was right to do so. Instead, I want to talk a little about why this matters to the case.

Neither Hamilton nor Jefferson explicitly took up the question of the nature of the Union in their opinions on the matter. But we can observe the gravitational effect of the issue in their opinions. Hamilton began by emphasizing that Congress is, within the scope of its enumerated powers, sovereign: this is exactly what Maryland would deny. And although Jefferson never speaks of sovereignty in so many words, yet it seems plain enough that he broadly agreed with Maryland's view of the relationship between the states and the federal (what Marshall calls the "general") government: that the latter is to be subordinate to the former, that it should only with great reluctance trample upon the ancient laws of the states. Indeed, as we will see in the next module, Jefferson himself was, in another context, the first great theorist of the idea Maryland is appealing to here, what we call the "Compact Doctrine" (for it sees the Constitution only as a "compact" among the States).

The suggestion, then, is that if we were to regard the federal Union in this way, if we were to say that the Constitution had been created by the states, then what Hamilton says about the sovereign nature of federal power would not be true. In that world, the Constitution's grants of power would not properly be read to include "a right to employ all the means requisite, and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power," in Hamilton's terms.

Marshall does not say a lot about why this is so, about why the one implies the other. But he does provide us with a demonstrative example. The very next passage of the opinion, after he rejects Maryland's contention about the nature of the Union, concerns the second question in the case, federal supremacy. But then, turning back to the first question, Marshall notes that there is no provision in the Constitution overtly rejecting the doctrine of implied powers. This is a marked departure, he observes, from the Articles of Confederation, whose second article had stated that

Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.

Our Tenth Amendment largely tracks the second half of this provision, but, as Marshall keenly observes, it omits the word "expressly." This, he thinks, was no accident:

The men who drew and adopted this amendment had experienced the embarrassments resulting from the insertion of this word in the Articles of Confederation, and probably omitted it to avoid those embarrassments.

Of course the Articles of Confederation was exactly the kind of thing that Maryland wrongly considered the federal Constitution: a league among sovereign states. That the Continental Congress, under the Articles, had no implied powers therefore suggests that our Congress, under our very different Constitution, does have them. Indeed, there is a suggestion that this may have been one of the reasons for replacing the Articles with a true national government.

From this point, we move to the meat of the issue. Marshall tells us, not so much why it makes sense to read our Constitution this way, but why it made sense to write a constitution this way. We could imagine, after all, that the Framers could have given Congress more substantial powers without leaving any of those powers to implication. But, Marshall says, this would have been no good:

A Constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.

Yes, you could have just listed all the powers, Marshall says, but that would have been bad! It would have made the thing long, unwieldy, and difficult to comprehend. (Interestingly, many modern constitutions – notably the German – have tended more toward the "prolixity of a legal code" than ours.)

Later on, Marshall gives another reason why it would have been actively bad to list every single means in Congress's toolkit: the Constitution is "intended to endure for ages to come." It must therefore be "adapted to the various crises of human affairs." Giving an exhaustive list of the means by which the government could carry out its mission would have left it rigid and inflexible. It might be that some day, circumstances unforeseen at the Founding would require some means the Framers would not have anticipated. The doctrine of implied powers has no trouble with this: a Jeffersonian strict construction would.

In this argument, we can see an echo of Hamilton's point that expediency may vary but the underlying constitutional principles cannot. In Hamilton's terms, we would say that the government must already have been endowed, at the Founding, with all those means which would ever prove needful over the full sweep of history. Marshall, I think, leaves open the possibility that, instead, those means only become constitutional when they become needful. In practice there is not much difference.

Anyway. After making his point about the "prolixity of a legal code," after his famous (and somewhat delphic) proclamation that "we must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding," Marshall canvasses the enumerated powers, and finds in them plenty of broad implication. They are, he says, "the great powers," running to the "sword and the purse, all the external relations, and no inconsiderable portion of the industry of the nation." It cannot be meant, he says, to have given Congress these great powers but withhold from it the means to employ them successfully. We should not, if we have any alternative, "impute to the framers of that instrument, when granting these powers for the public good, the intention of impeding their exercise, by withholding a choice of means."

Indeed, he continues, no one really denies this. In general, everyone admits that "the powers given to the Government imply the ordinary means of execution." It is only as to this one specific means, the chartering of a corporation, that seems to have raised such a hue and cry. Marshall does not wax quite as poetic as Hamilton on the topic of "hey, what's the big deal, everyone??" But he makes much the same point: there is no good reason for singling out this one specific means as requiring extraordinary justification.

The reason given for this, Marshall says, is that "the power of creating a corporation is one appertaining to sovereignty." This brings us back to the point about the nature of the federal government. Maryland had claimed that sovereignty lies only with the states, and that therefore only the states should possess the power of forming corporations. But this is fallacious, Marshall says, for "all legislative powers appertain to sovereignty." (Emphasis mine.) If Maryland's logic were accepted, then, how could we explain why Congress is able to make any laws at all? Indeed, although forming corporations is unquestionably an aspect of sovereignty, Marshall says, it is not one of those "great substantive and independent power[s]" like making war or levying taxes. It is "never the end for which other powers are exercised, but a means by which other objects are accomplished." We saw Hamilton make much the same point.

Now, you will note that all that has been said so far is ample to decide the case. And it is only at this point that Marshall brings up the Necessary and Proper Clause. The role of that Clause is only to confirm that which we should already have understood. Much like the Tenth Amendment, it makes explicit something which would otherwise have been implicit: "the right of Congress to employ the necessary means for the execution of the powers." The Necessary and Proper Clause is not why this is true, for Marshall; its function is only to remove all doubt, to ensure that the matter is not left to "general reasoning."

Of course, for Marshall, having articulated his Hamiltonian view of broad federal power, it is natural then to read the Necessary and Proper Clause and say, "yep, sure enough!" But Maryland, like Jefferson, advanced a more restrictive view of the Clause. Indeed, Maryland seems to have come up with a counterargument that did not even occur to Jefferson. The role of the Necessary and Proper Clause, they say, is to authorize Congress to pass laws.

Like, at all.

I confess that I have also occasionally had this thought, when reading through Article I, Section 8. You'll notice, if you read through the enumerated powers with this thought in mind, that they are all powers to do things. The power to coin money is a good one: we might think, almost not implausibly, that this means that the membership of Congress are to go work the national mint. But then the Necessary and Proper Clause comes along to disabuse us of this notion: no, they are to carry out their various powers by passing laws. Not literally coining money themselves, but passing laws telling other people to coin money. And, viewing the Clause in this light, Maryland is able to give it a restrictive character: it does not authorize Congress to pass any kind of law, but only one that is "necessary and proper."

Of course this is absurd, and Marshall is unsparing about why. The Vesting Clause describes the powers of Congress as "legislative;" Article I, Section 7 describes the method of passing laws. "Could it be necessary to say that a legislature should exercise legislative powers, in the shape of legislation?" No, no it could not. "That a legislature, endowed with legislative powers, can legislate is a proposition too self-evident to have been questioned." The power to coin money, conferred on a legislature, simply is the power to pass laws for the coining of money. Gimme a break.

From this farce we proceed to the more familiar ground, the dispute over the meaning of the word "necessary." We have already seen this point disputed by Jefferson and Hamilton; Marshall's arguments on the topic do not add much to what Hamilton had already said. Maryland, like Jefferson, thought that the word "limit[ed] the right to pass laws for the execution of the granted powers to such as are indispensable, and without which the power would be nugatory. That it excludes the choice of means, and leaves to Congress in each case that only which is most direct and simple." But, says Marshall – like Hamilton before him – this is not the only way to read the word. It does not "always import an absolute physical necessity so strong that one thing to which another may be termed necessary cannot exist without that other;" it can just as easily mean "that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another."

There follows a brief digression into philosophy of language, and in my view an enlightening one:

Such is the character of human language that no word conveys to the mind in all situations one single definite idea, and nothing is more common than to use words in a figurative sense. Almost all compositions contain words which, taken in a their rigorous sense, would convey a meaning different from that which is obviously intended. It is essential to just construction that many words which import something excessive should be understood in a more mitigated sense – in that sense which common usage justifies. The word "necessary" is of this description. It has not a fixed character peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison, and is often connected with other words which increase or diminish the impression the mind receives of the urgency it imports. A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary. To no mind would the same idea be conveyed by these several phrases.

This quality of human language is, of course, highly embarrassing for those who would make legal interpretation a mechanical thing, who want to find the One Objectively Correct Interpretation of every legal text. Words, Marshall says, do not have single universal meanings in that way. They can bear a variety of meanings, or shades thereof, and which one is meant in any given context will depend on, well, context. In this context, Marshall says, the strict constructionists are essentially splicing the word "absolutely" in before the word "necessary" – much as they might be thought to have inserted the word "expressly" into the Tenth Amendment.

And of course we can see why the Framers did not say "absolutely necessary" here, for this would have clashed with the entire structure of their scheme. Here Marshall retraces much of his argument from earlier in the opinion. The government is meant to work:

The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare of a Nation essentially depends. It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers to insure, so far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution.

This, he says, "could not be done by confiding the choice of means to such narrow limits" as Maryland has in mind. Here we get the point about how the Constitution is meant to endure through the ages:

It would have been an unwise attempt to provide by immutable rules for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. To have declared that the best means shall not be used, but those alone without which the power given would be nugatory, would have been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.

The next several paragraphs are taken up with illustrations of everything that the government could not do, were the strict construction adopted. Most significantly, Marshall says, nowhere does the Constitution expressly say that Congress can provide for violations of its laws to be punished. Actually, that's not quite right: there are two places where it does so provide, as to counterfeiting and as to piracy and other offenses committed on the high seas. Applying the strict construction, then, we should surely conclude that, except as to these two narrow fields, Congress is powerless to make criminal laws. This does not make any of its other powers nugatory, for it can still make laws, which will have a moral force if nothing else. It can still establish its post offices, even if it cannot make robbing the mails a crime.

Of course this is absurd:

The good sense of the public has pronounced without hesitation that the power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised, whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidental to his Constitutional powers. It is a means for carrying into execution all sovereign powers, and may be used although not indispensably necessary. It is a right incidental to the power, and conducive to its beneficial exercise.

The parallel to the power of forming corporations is obvious. Indeed, Marshall notes, creating a corporation does not involve the exercise of coercive force. If the latter can be founded on mere implication, why cannot the former?

But the real problem with Maryland's restrictive reading of the Clause, Marshall says, is simply that it is contrary to the whole plan of the Constitution. Of course we know, on Marshall's view – both of the Clause and of the Constitution as a whole – the former merely restates the general plan of the latter. But Maryland, Marshall says, would make the Clause a limit imposed over and against what would otherwise be the character of the thing. But this makes no sense textually, because (1) the Clause is placed among the grants of power to Congress, not among the limitations in Article I, Section 9; and (2) its language is that of a grant of power, not of a restriction. It could have been written as a restriction: it could have said something along the lines of, "In carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all others, &c., no laws shall be passed but such as are necessary and proper." That's not how it was written, and it simply makes no sense to read the actual Clause as a limit.

This is the end of the matter. The next paragraph is Marshall's summing-up; it is the holding of the case:

We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the Government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are Constitutional. 

Emphasis mine, for this is the most important sentence in the history of American law. It is the canonical statement of the doctrine of implied powers, and it is, to this day, the test of congressional power. If you learn literally nothing else from this series, this one sentence would stand you in pretty good stead.

How do you go about applying this test? Well, Marshall proceeds to give a demonstration in the next few paragraphs. There are really two questions:

  • Is this law "plainly adapted" to some enumerated power of Congress? (For these are, of course, the "legitimate" ends, the ones "within the scope of the Constitution.")
  • Is the law "prohibited" by the Constitution, or is it "consistent with the letter and spirit" thereof?

The first question can be thought to attend the word "necessary;" the latter, "proper." Marshall says that there is no question that the Bank is "an appropriate measure," and I think this must mean that it does not fall within any constitutional prohibition, does not violate anything in the Bill of Rights, etc.

The only question, then, is whether the Bank is necessary to one or more of the enumerated powers of Congress. And there is simply no disputing that it is:

That it is a convenient, a useful, and essential instrument in the prosecution of its fiscal operations is not now a subject of controversy. All those who have been concerned in the administration of our finances have concurred in representing its importance and necessity, and so strongly have they been felt that Statesmen of the first class, whose previous opinions against it had been confirmed by every circumstance which can fix the human judgment, have yielded those opinions to the exigencies of the nation.

Again, he means Madison.

There is a bit more rehearsing of the reasons why a corporation does not require any special justification above and beyond any other means Congress might choose to employ. And Marshall, echoing Hamilton as usual, says that the existence of state banks cannot possibly bear on the matter: for "[n]o trace is to be found in the Constitution of an intention to create a dependence of the Government of the Union on those of the States, for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. Its means are adequate to its ends, and on those means alone was it expected to rely for the accomplishment of its ends." But all of this is pretty rote, at this point, given what Marshall has already decided. Indeed he says as much, noting that the choice between state banks and a national bank is undoubtedly left to Congress, as part of its general choice of means.

There is, however, one point of real interest in Marshall's discussion of the necessity of the Bank. Something that is not in Hamilton's opinion, indeed, something that really could not have been: for it is specific to the judicial function. The question of judicial review, of the power of courts to disregard Acts of Congress that they see as unconstitutional, had of course been of some significant controversy earlier in Marshall's tenure. And he reiterates here that, yes, courts can and will strike down federal laws when compelled to do so:

Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the Constitution, or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the Government, it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.

But the scope of this inquiry is limited:

[W]here the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the Government, to undertake here to inquire into the decree of its necessity would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department and to tread on legislative ground. This Court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.

Hamilton, of course, had no occasion to say anything like this, because he was not writing in a judicial context. Again I think we can see what Marshall is saying here as a variant on Hamilton's point about why expediency cannot be the test of lawfulness. Hamilton would say that a law must be within the power of Congress, whether or not it is expedient under the present circumstances. For Marshall, it is at least conceptually possible that whether a law is constitutional might depend on whether it is expedient. But the determination of expediency is itself entirely left to Congress. Making that determination is "legislative ground," and courts are not to second-guess it. It is enough that Congress thinks the law is expedient. And of course, Congress does not pass laws it does not think expedient.

Again, therefore, Marshall and Hamilton's ways of thinking come to much the same thing. The test is not whether the law is actually useful to carrying out Congress's agenda, certainly not whether it is the most useful means of doing so. Rather, we ask whether the law is "plainly adapted" to one or more of the enumerated powers. In other words, is this the kind of thing that someone might sensibly try, as a means of achieving this goal? Does it look like a measure shaped, in some way, by the practical logic of the avowed task at hand? If not, then we might start to suspect that the law's professed ends are disingenuous, that the connection to the enumerated powers is merely pretextual. In this case, and only in this case, a court could be justified in striking such a law down as exceeding the scope of Congress's powers, express and implied. (Spoiler alert: this basically never happens.)

And... we're done! That's the whole of Marshall's opinion on the question of implied powers: without much question, the most significant passage in the annals of the Supreme Court.

I'll be back next time to talk about the second question in the case: federal supremacy.

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