Welcome back to Constitutional Perspectives!
As I said in the introduction to Level Two, this Level will mostly be divided into "modules," sequences of several essays all on a single topic. Today marks the first installment of the Level Two module on the question of the implied powers of Congress. This is commonly considered the most important question in all of American constitutional law. It is also the oldest controversy in American constitutional politics; it consumed the nation for a solid thirty years after the adoption of the Constitution. Even after the debate was settled in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) – the most important case the Supreme Court ever decided – President Andrew Jackson's retrograde view on the matter continued to have a major influence on public life arguably all the way through the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913.
The goal of this module, then, is to give this most fundamental question a thorough and comprehensive examination. This piece will try to explain what the question is, partly by giving a sketch of how the question arose in the first place. Then the next few lessons will relate how the question was resolved, both at the Founding and a generation later in McCulloch. The goal will be to acquaint the reader with the arguments made on both sides of the question, and to help them understand why the side that prevailed was the right one. This understanding will serve the reader in good stead in all future modules and lessons, both because this question itself is very important and because it makes for excellent practice understanding the contours of a constitutional argument.
Okay, let's get started.
Of course it was Hamilton's fault.
As you know from Level One, the Constitution was ratified by sufficient states to take effect in 1788. Operation of the new government actually began on March 4th, 1789. And one of the chief orders of business was doing something about the national debt. This had been, after all, a chief motivation for making a whole new Constitution in the first place. The country had run up a significant debt during the Revolutionary War. But the Continental Congress had basically no ability to raise funds to pay that debt. The Articles of Confederation gave it no power to levy taxes on individuals. All it could do was ask the states to make contributions. And, well, they weren't really inclined to do that.
So the debt became a problem, not least because much of that debt was owed to the soldiers who had just fought in the Revolution. These same difficulties raising revenue meant that Congress had often been forced to pay its soldiers in, essentially, IOUs. Now that the war was over, the soldiers wanted their pay, and they were getting kind of restless. This, as mentioned, was a big part of the impetus for the new Constitution. It is essentially why General George Washington became involved in the project: in 1783 he had had to settle a mutinous conspiracy by soldiers unhappy about their lack of pay.
Okay, great. The new Constitution was adopted; the new Congress had a taxing power of its own. But a plan was still needed to actually handle the debt. And the task of coming up with that plan fell to Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton. You might've heard of him, perhaps in a hit Broadway musical. If so, much of the story I am about to tell should be familiar to you, at least in its broad strokes. Hamilton was charged by Congress with writing a report on the public debt. He did so. In fact he wrote four major reports to Congress that, collectively, proposed a comprehensive economic policy for the fledgling nation. (Believe it or not, there was actually controversy about this: some thought it improper for a member of the executive branch to be proposing legislation. Imagine that!) It is the first two, the two Reports on the Public Credit delivered in 1790, that interest us.
The goal of the First Report on Public Credit was to establish the United States as creditworthy. This was no small task, because the country to this point had basically made no real effort to pay its debts. The Continental Congress had done all of the things you aren't supposed to do with public debt: repudiated it, printed money to pay it, etc. There were proposals floating around the First Congress to repudiate much of the debt that remained. Many of the soldiers' IOUs were now held by speculators, who had bought them off the actual soldiers. And many in Congress thought that these speculators were not entitled to the full value of their coupons. They had various schemes to try to make the payments on these coupons go back to the original holders, who had generally sold them at a significant discount.
Hamilton had no interest in any of this. The only way to make the nation creditworthy was to pay the debts in full, to their current bearers. The holder of the United States debt instrument had to be able to rely on the validity thereof. And Hamilton didn't just want to pay the debts of the Union itself: he wanted the federal government to "assume" the war debts of the thirteen states. There were a bunch of reasons for this. For one thing, he did not trust the states to actually pay their debts in a responsible fashion. And he didn't want the states competing with his Treasury for revenue. But it was also a ploy to get the financial class invested in the success of the new federal government. And, when the government finally did pay down the states' debts as well as its own, it would do that much more to establish its creditworthiness.
Of course this meant raising an awful lot of revenue. Congress had already passed a tariff, something Hamilton would later endorse as a tool of industrial policy and mercantilist economic development. His First Report also proposed a tax on intoxicating spirits. He thought this would be generally acceptable, as a kind of sin tax. He was, well, wrong about that: the result was the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania, where, well, they really liked their whiskey. This tendency to not quite understand why people would get mad at him was a recurring issue for Hamilton. He could see the logic of his proposals; why couldn't everyone else??
Anyway. In that same vein, the assumption of debts also sparked resistance in Congress: as with all of Hamilton's proposals, the South felt that he was favoring the economic interests of the North at their expense, for the Southern states had relatively light debt burdens compared to the Northern ones. Federal revenue was generated throughout the nation. Hamilton's plan, then, would effectively have made every state responsible for every state's debts. James Madison, late of the Constitutional Convention but now a leading member of the Virginia delegation to the House of Representatives, led the fight against the assumption of debts – until the fateful "dinner table bargain," orchestrated by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, wherein Madison agreed to drop his opposition in exchange for moving the national capital to the Potomac River between Maryland and Virginia. The deal went through in July 1790, the last piece of Hamilton's plan from the First Report to gain congressional approval.
Ah, but there was something missing from Hamilton's plan, something important. His Second Report on the Public Credit came out in December 1790, and it proposed the measure for which Hamilton is probably best known: the creation of a national bank. Modeled largely on the Bank of England, Hamilton's bank was to play a key role in the process of paying the debt – and, generally, in improving the financial flow of the national economy. I am not quite well enough versed in the economics to understand exactly how this all was supposed to work. Nor do I exactly understand why the South, again, thought that the Bank would favor Northern interests at its expense, except just in that the financial center of the nation was in New York. To some extent it was a difference in philosophy: finance and commerce was the Northern way of life, farming and agriculture the Southern way. In any event, the South did oppose the Bank, and Madison – who only a couple of years prior had been Hamilton's partner in writing the Federalist Papers – again led the charge.
This time, Madison went so far as to argue that Hamilton's proposal was unconstitutional. And it is this objection that interests us. The substance of Madison's objection was, in a sense, simple enough: nothing in the Constitution gave Congress the power to charter a corporation. This, he said, was purely a state function, an aspect of their sovereignty that had not been delegated to the federal government. You may recall that the chartering of corporations had played a rather significant role in the early history of America, for that is what the various British colonies had been: corporations, chartered by the Crown. By the late eighteenth century, corporations were just beginning to take their familiar, modern form.
Of course the response, from Hamilton initially and from many others thereafter, was not to say that the Constitution did expressly authorize Congress to charter corporations. It plainly does not. Nor did Hamilton deny that Congress can do only those things it was empowered by the Constitution to do. People sometimes associate this principle with the enumeration of congressional power in Article I, Section 8. But really, it is much broader than that: this is an inherent principle of constitutional government. All political power, after all, belongs originally to the People. They grant some of that power to the various organs of government, and the Constitution is the instrument through which this delegation is made. Any organ of government, then, can have only those powers that the Constitution confers upon it. It so happens that Congress is given only specific, enumerated powers, but it could have been otherwise: state constitutions, after all, typically gave their legislatures plenary legislative power. But it is still true in such a system that the legislature has only those powers given by the Constitution.
To say that the Bank was lawful, then, Hamilton had to say that the Constitution gave Congress this power, and moreover that it did so implicitly. We will see next time why exactly Hamilton thought this, and why Jefferson denied it. For now it is enough simply to state the form of the claim. The idea is, broadly, that the enumerated powers speak to the ends of government. They do not speak to the means. Rather, Congress is given a broad choice of the means by which it will pursue its enumerated ends. A bank, Hamilton thought, was a useful means of pursuing many of the ends listed in Article I, Section 8, notably though not exclusively the raising of revenue. Therefore, chartering a bank was within the constitutional grant of power. That chartering a corporation was not specifically listed among the powers is to be expected, for a corporation is a means, not an end.
This idea is often associated with the final of the eighteen enumerated powers of Congress, the Necessary and Proper Clause. On this framing, the idea is that chartering a corporation, e.g., is "necessary and proper to carrying into execution" the other enumerated powers of government. We will see next time the way that Hamilton and Jefferson debated the proper construction of this Clause. I am personally of the view that, while the Clause is hardly unrelated to the issue, it is wrong to say that the Bank, for example, was an exercise of "the Necessary and Proper power" or anything like that. Rather, the Clause is best seen as announcing a rule of construction: namely that Congress does in fact have implied powers in this way. Indeed, seeing it this way helps to understand why Hamilton is right, why he must be right. But that is for next time.
For now, the point I want to drive home is just the significant of the question. Not even practically, so much. We often say that little of what the federal government does today could survive if the question of implied powers had been settled the other way. And this is not untrue, exactly. But you can actually do quite a lot with only literal uses of the enumerated powers themselves. The very heart of the Commerce power, the power to regulate what happens at state boundary lines, is enough, in our times, to support a comprehensive scheme of national economic regulation. Meanwhile, most of the government's own activities, the things it spends its money on, are not so much about the question of implied powers as that of internal improvements. (I'll cover that issue, which is much less theoretically interesting, in a coda at the end of the module.)
No, the significance I want to stress is mostly conceptual. The question of implied powers is something like a decoder ring for the entire Constitution. The answer to this question helps us answer every other question. Hell, the way we go about answering this question provides a model for how we think about all other questions. In the early Republic, it was this issue that marked the divide between so-called "strict" and "broad" construction. To be a strict constructionist was to deny that Congress has implied powers; to be a broad constructionist was to affirm that it does. Today, those names are taken to stand for far broader philosophies of interpretation.
The question of implied powers, moreover, is intimately bound up in the only other question with a claim to equal or greater importance: the nature of the Union. As we will see when examining Hamilton and Jefferson's views on the matter, the strict constructionist view derived from a view of the federal Union as merely a confederacy of sovereign states. The Hamiltonian view, conversely, flowed from seeing the Union (correctly) as a true nation, created not by the states but by the People as a single, sovereign whole. The nature of the Union will be the subject of the second module of Level Two, but it will loom over this first module, as well.
Finally, the question of implied powers is of great importance because of how it inspired the Reconstruction Amendments. Each of those three amendments says that Congress can enforce their provisions through "appropriate" legislation. This was a self-conscious reference to the McCulloch formulation for understanding the implied powers. Congress's power to guarantee human rights, then, is directly inspired by the Hamiltonian philosophy of broad construction. And it is by understanding the scope of the implied powers generally that we come to understand the (very broad) scope of the human rights power.
These, then, are the stakes of the question. I'll be back next time for a close read of Hamilton and Jefferson's arguments in what has become known as Cabinet Battle #1.


