One idea that you will hear me talk about a lot, in everything that the Constitutional Innovation Center will be doing, is the idea that the People must reclaim their authorship of the Constitution. This is an incredibly important idea for my whole project, and I don't think it is especially intuitive what I mean by it, so I want to explain the idea at some length here.
At a very basic level, an author is the person who writes something. To say that the People are the authors of the Constitution, then, is to say that the Constitution is written by the People. Of course in a very literal sense this is not true: the document was written at the Philadelphia Convention, by a collection of delegates. Subsequent amendments were written by the Congress. But an important conceit in American constitutional theory is that the men at Philadelphia were not the true authors, but merely draftsmen acting on behalf of the sovereign People, much as a lawyer might prepare a contract for their client. The act of authorship occurred when the states ratified what the Convention had proposed, and, later, when the states ratified subsequent proposed amendments.
Now in the literary world, this would never do. We expect authors to have actually composed their works, not merely stamped their approval upon someone else's draftsmanship. But this is politics; we aren't looking for style points. And it turns out the idea of authorship as delegation plays an important role in the history of modern political thought. You might notice that the word shares a root with "authority." Now as far as I can tell, as far as the Online Etymology Dictionary has to say, this is to some extent misleading. The original sense of "authority" is not political, but informational. Nevertheless, the linking of authority and authorship is foundational to the social contract tradition.
This goes back to Thomas Hobbes, the first of the great contract theorists. As you may know, Hobbes envisioned a powerful sovereign, the figure of the Leviathan, whose power would keep the peace and prevent the emergence of the dreadful state of nature. This Leviathan would be created, Hobbes thought, through the mutual agreement of all the members in society. This social contract would deputize the Leviathan to act on behalf of the People. Its actions would be, in effect, their own. The Leviathan, in other words, has authority just because it is authorized by the People, who are then the authors of its actions.
Now there is plenty to quibble with in Hobbes's account of political authority, and authorship. This total identification of sovereign and subject is a big part of what makes Hobbes's contract theory so severe, why it offers no limit at all on the power of the state. John Locke's version of contract theory, on which the American government is largely based, leaves more space between the people and their government, more room for conflict and therefore for limit. Even in this liberal version, however, many of the same essential elements remain. Political power, sovereignty, belongs originally to every individual person. The people then come together to create a government, which has authority only insofar as it is authorized – whether this authorization be total or partial. Yes, our liberal, constitutional government has limits to its authority, unlike Hobbes's Leviathan. When it exercises power over me, it might be overstepping its bounds. But so long as it acts within those limits, we still say that I am the author of its actions, that, in Rousseau's famous phrase, I obey only myself.
When, exactly, we can say that the People have authorship of their government in this fashion is accordingly a question of the highest interest. It is perhaps the deepest question in all of political philosophy. Now I do not mean to answer this question in this essay. I have some ideas on the matter, ideas which I hope to develop in the next few years (with your generous support). For now, however, it is enough to observe the role, the function that popular authorship plays in the theory of the American constitutional order.
We often say that ours is the first written constitution in world history, but this is not strictly true. Societies have been writing down their systems of government since antiquity. Athenian law began to be written down around 620 B.C., when the statesman Draco grew frustrated with the oral legal tradition and wrote down a constitution for Athens. Some twenty-five years later, another statesman, Solon, revised Draco's constitution. Not only did Solon write his constitution down, he wrote it in poetry. Could James Madison do that?? (Maybe Hamilton could.)
What, then, do we mean when we call ours the first written constitution? Well, we mean that it is the first constitution written by the people. Before that, constitutions were typically enacted by rulers. Indeed, the English word "constitution" seems to have originated with edicts issued by the early Norman kings in the eleventh and twelfth centuries creating various tribunals. Solon was archon, one of the chief magistrates of ancient Athens, elected from among the nobility. Draco had been, so far as we can tell, just some guy. During the English Civil War, the Instrument of Government (which created for Oliver Cromwell the position of Lord Protector) was adopted by the Council of Officers, i.e. by the leading officers of the New Model Army. These things were imposed, from above.
America's Constitution was not like that. Yes, a handful of statesmen gathered in Philadelphia to draft the thing. It was in a very real sense an elite project, reflecting the dissatisfaction that Madison and Hamilton felt at the status quo under the Articles. But they never conceived of themselves as having the power to make a constitution, to give the thing they drafted force of law. Indeed, the awareness that whatever the Convention would produce would ultimately have to be ratified by the thirteen states shaped every facet of their deliberations.
When we say we have a written Constitution, then, this is what we mean. What we invented – technically beginning not with the federal Constitution of 1787 but with the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which was ratified in a popular referendum – was having the People write their own constitution. The Constitution is not just written on paper; that is not the part that matters. It is a written legal instrument. The text itself is merely the memorialization of a great act done by the People, as sovereigns. It is in the doing of this act that they became the authors of their own fundamental law.
(This can cause confusion in the domain of constitutional interpretation, by the way. When people hear it said that we have a written Constitution, they think that this means the Constitution is nothing more than the words written on the page. Thus any rule of constitutional law that cannot be clearly traced to specific words on the page are deemed "made up." But in fact the writtenness of our Constitution is just a statement about the authority of the act which the words memorialize, that it is the source of all political authority in our system. It does not really speak to the question of whether that act might have implications that are not stated explicitly in the text.)
Nor was this authorship merely meant to be a one-time thing. Solon had provided for his Athenian constitution to remain in force for one hundred years, with no possibility of modification. Our Constitution, by contrast, provided for its own amendment through popular means. This was meant to maintain the People's authorship of the document in perpetuity. It is not only that we have the power to write new law into being: because this power exists, it may be presumed that, if we decline to use it, we are satisfied with our Constitution as it stands. Whether we ratify new amendments or not, we are constantly ratifying the Constitution as our own.
That's the theory, anyway. I have already written elsewhere about the ways in which this connection has broken down. What I want to talk about here is not so much the technical details of this breakdown but the attitude that has resulted from it. The American People no longer see ourselves as the authors of our own Constitution, of our own fate. We are ruled by a President, a Congress, a Supreme Court. Why? Because we have chosen to be ruled by them? No. These institutions are a mere Solonian inheritance for us. They exist because our ancestors created them. We were born to them. We have essentially abandoned the idea that what the Constitution says tomorrow is up to all of us today.
Is it surprising, then, that the Constitution has come to be seen as something foreign to us? We do not regard it as our own enactment – and with good reason, for it is no creation of ours. When it is transgressed, therefore, we do not feel a violation of our own persons. The offense is, perhaps, against the ancients, against Jefferson and Washington, not against you and me. And Jefferson would be the first to tell you that we owe him no such fealty. This is why, I have to think, the Constitution is missing a constituency. That constituency should be the People who are its authors. But those people are dead, and their organic connection to the Constitution has not been kept alive.
One thing this implies is that the doing of constitutional reform is almost more important than the substance of the reforms. What matters is to renew the sense in the American People that they are the authors of their own fundamental law. And this can probably only be done by a new act of authorship. Even just putting the existing constitution, word for word, up for ratification again could do the trick, though of course that would not be my first choice. What matters, for this purpose, is not what the Constitution says, but that it says only what the People wish it to say. That it exists only because we will it to exist.
There is a related point, perhaps as important again: in order to undertake a new act of constitution-making, we would need to overcome whatever obstacles are currently sapping our capacity for that kind of sovereign action. If the Constitution is what constitutes us as a People, as a nation, then the fact that we have become incapable of rewriting our own Constitution speaks to our dissolution as a People and as a nation. Think about what people say any time the topic of constitutional amendment comes up: oh, we are too divided for that. This is not some trifling matter. This is not the ordinary division of a free, pluralist society. Even under conditions of pluralism, people are meant to be able to agree on the basic principles organizing the state, setting out the terms of political competition. That we cannot imagine doing this is partly the fault of Article V, yes. But in times gone by, we were able to reach a degree of national consensus on fundamental questions of reform sufficient that the flaws of Article V did not matter.
Now, though, we are in something resembling a state of civil war. Not armed conflict, to be sure. But it is fair to say that there is not really any social compact uniting the American People together into a single political society. We are at war with ourselves, we are fighting over essential principles of national identity. Our "ordinary" political competition has become a vehicle for this fight, with all ordinary questions of public policy – of "the public and its problems," in John Dewey's famous phrase – subsumed in the great conflict. Of course we are incapable of authoring our own Constitution, in such a state!
Now this suggests in turn that the task of restoring constitutional authorship to the American People is first and foremost a question of politics. It is, in that sense, above my pay grade. The fight for universal democracy in America must be won before any new constitutional settlement can be forged – just as had to happen in the 1860s. And yet I think the dependency is not altogether one-sided. Part of what prevents us from resolving our fundamental political conflict is that we have lost our sense of ourselves as authors of our own constitutional fate. Yes, we fight about fundamental constitutional questions in our everyday politics. But we have no serious hope of resolving those fights. No one is organizing toward a change in the Constitution itself, even though that is what both sides of the fight really want.
How then to proceed? The theory of the Constitutional Innovation Center is that the People's sense of constitutional authorship can be rekindled even before any new moment of constituent action. Really, when you think about it, this must be so: for without that sense, we cannot undertake such an action. The best way to do this, the only way that I can see, is to spark people's imagination. We are always asking the question: how would you fix the Constitution? One reason why is that, when we take up this question, we necessarily imagine ourselves as authors of the thing. This may be a mere hypothetical, at first: what would you do if you were in charge? But of course that is the illusion: we are in charge, not individually of course, but collectively. Though we have no efficacious means to amend the Constitution through law, yet it is still true that it exists only because we make it exist. That is how political legitimacy works: if we all stop believing in it, it vanishes. And if people get to thinking about what they would do with this power that they already have, perhaps some day they will think to use it.


