In 1748, the great Scottish philosopher David Hume wrote an essay called Of the Original Contract. This was Hume's response to John Locke's theory of government, and to the school of "social contract theory" following in Locke's footsteps. The contract theorists held, as a Lockean liberal by the name of Thomas Jefferson would put it some thirty years after Hume wrote, that "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." This, Hume thought, was absurd. No government in the history of mankind had ever rested on such a foundation. To the contary:
Almost all the governments, which exist at present, or of which there remains any record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the people.
There was no point, Hume thought, in complaining about this state of affairs. Agitation based on Locke's liberal theories could only result in social unrest and disorder. The rule of the strong was simply the way of the world. It always had been. The close of the essay reflected Hume's conservative outlook:
New discoveries are not to be expected in these matters. If scarce any man, till very lately, ever imagined that government was founded on compact, it is certain, that it cannot, in general, have any such foundation.
The crime of rebellion among the ancients was commonly expressed by the terms νεωτεριζειν, novas res moliri.
That Greek word is neoterizein, "to introduce new things." Or in other words, to innovate.
Some forty years after Hume wrote this essay, a bunch of former British colonists on the Atlantic seaboard were trying to prove him wrong. One of those men, Alexander Hamilton, wrote (most of) a lengthy series of essays supporting the ratification y New York State of what we now know as the United States Constitution. In the opening paragraph of the very first of these Federalist Papers, Hamilton wrote that
It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.
Of course in the centuries since Hamilton wrote these words, the task of deciding this important question has spread itself across the globe. It is no longer a uniquely American project. It is, however, of some special relevance to America in our time. Hamilton wrote these words in support of what we now know as the United States Constitution. The ratification of that Constitution served, for Hamilton, as the triumph of reflection and choice over accident and force. Americans (some of them, anyway) came together as a people to create a new form of government, one that "la[id] its foundation on such principles and organiz[ed] its powers in such form, as to them [seemed] most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness," as Jefferson had written in the Declaration of Independence.
Today, however...
Both because of the special reverence we hold for our Constitution and because it is so very difficult to amend, our "political constitution" is first and foremost the result of path dependency. The Constitution is a collection of solutions to problems that have arisen over the course of two centuries. They remain the law of the land not so much because they still suit our needs but because of inertia. Once something becomes a part of our fundamental law, it cannot be dislodged without extraordinary effort.
The Electoral College is a perfect example. It was designed, by Founding Father James Wilson, to serve a very particular purpose. That purpose is often misunderstood, but it becomes clear enough when we follow the developments at the Constitutional Convention. Early on, Wilson himself had proposed choosing the president by a single national election, a popular vote as we would now call it. Not a single one of the other delegates at the Convention supported the idea. The Convention then spent months exploring other possibilities for how to choose the president. Ultimately, none of these alternatives proved satisfactory, essentially because they would make the president too dependent on some other institution: either Congress or the state legislatures. Thus, the delegates turned their gaze back to Wilson. A true national popular vote was still a nonstarter. But Wilson was clever, and he put that cleverness to use, crafting the Electoral College as the nearest approximation of a national election that would avoid the various difficulties with an actual popular vote.
What difficulties? Essentially that a popular vote held across state lines would create strange incentives for states to change their suffrage laws. Suppose that a state wanted to increase its influence in presidential elections. One rather natural way to do this would be by allowing more people to vote. At the Founding, voting rights were extremely narrow: in most states, only those who owned property to vote. (This served to restrict voting to white men, principally. In many states, the exclusion of women and African-Americans from voting did not have to be made explicit until the property qualifications for voting were removed after the Founding.)
But this was a matter of state law. A state might, therefore, allow women to vote, thereby increasing its total number of voters. That wouldn't matter for congressional elections, where each state had a fixed number of representatives based on its population, not on how many people actually voted. But in a national popular vote, it would matter a lot. A popular election for president would therefore put tremendous pressure on the states to let more and more people vote. And no one wanted that, not in 1787. There was another wrinkle in the Southern states, where a large portion of the populace was enslaved. The Three-Fifths Compromise allowed these Southern states to gain political power based on their slave populations, who were of course not allowed to vote. This simply could not be done in a popular vote.
Enter the Electoral College. Because each state was given a fixed number of electoral votes, this competitive pressure to expand suffrage would not exist. By the same token, the Three-Fifths Compromise could be reflected in presidential elections, too. (In fact this was automatic, since the number of electoral votes was based on representation in Congress.) From the vantage of 1787, we can acknowledge this as a truly brilliant solution on Wilson's part. His invention allowed the country to simulate a national presidential election (which, recall, was his own preferred method) within the inescapable political constraints of the age.
The problem is that those constraints no longer exist. Today, we have something approximating universal suffrage. In particular, the exclusion of both women and African-Americans from voting has been abolished by constitutional amendment. The result is that, while Wilson had good reason to craft a simulacrum of a popular election for president, today we are using that simulacrum for no reason at all. Except that it is just how we do things, how we have always done things. Because the system we have works well enough, most of the time, and because it would be too hard to change it. This is not, I daresay, what Hamilton had in mind.
The mission of the Constitutional Innovation Center, then, is to change this. To restore to America the spirit of "establish[ing] good government through reflection and choice." We should not feel cursed forever to follow the old ways. That is not the American way, or at least it wasn't meant to be. We should instead feel free to innovate, to craft new solutions to our own problems, to tailor our institutions to our own needs. The Constitution itself wants to be updated to suit the needs of each successive generation: that is why it provides for its own amendment. Unfortunately, of course, the amendment process is hideously broken, the Constitution's single worst provision, in my view. This is the obstacle that simply must be overcome if we are to enter upon a new age of constitutional creativity, and a significant portion of my own work at the Center will be focused specifically on this issue.


