No. 1: Why a New Constitution?

The Constitutional Innovation Center’s Reconstitution Project is organized around a single, central question: how would you fix the United States Constitution? As Director of the Center, I have offered my own answer to this question as a way to get the ball rolling. I have a great many ideas about what needs fixing, and I have chosen to present those ideas by drafting a new constitution. Taking inspiration from the Federalist Papers, I will also be writing a series of essays explaining the thinking behind my proposal. Because the proposal itself is of such a sweeping nature, this is no small task. This is the first installment in the series; future editions will be published regularly over the next several weeks.

The first question I must address, of course, is why I have proposed a whole new constitution, rather than a mere slate of amendments. Certainly there is a great deal of work to be done, such that one or two amendments each confined to a particular subject would not suffice. But the American Constitution of 1787 is nonetheless an object of enormous veneration, and rightly so. It is the first popular, written, national constitution in world history: that it endures to this day is a source of considerable national pride. I am proposing to replace it wholesale. Why?

Before giving my answer, I should say that framing my proposal as a new constitution is meant to be provocative as much as anything. I do not consider myself committed to the view that we need a new constitution. I do, however, believe that we need to think about the question, to take it seriously. Framing my proposal this way, then, is meant to prompt that very conversation. Moreover, to answer the question of whether we should adopt a whole new constitution, it is helpful to envision what one might look like if it were to be made.

Conversely, I should say that my attitude in drafting this new constitution was to emphasize continuity as much as possible. The idea is not to repudiate the entire American constitutional tradition, but to revitalize it. For this reason, among others, I have copied the preamble of the 1787 Constitution verbatim. And I have purposefully retained as much of the architecture of the existing constitutional order as I could. I have not, for instance, proposed replacing the American federal model of presidentialism with checks and balances with the Westminster parliamentary system. Arguments could be made why that would be superior, but it was not the task I set myself. The conceit of this proposal is that this is, in some sense, just a new version of the existing thing: Constitution 2.0, you might say, in modern lingo.

With those clarifications out of the way, let me turn to the question itself. Why should we adopt a new constitution, rather than simply amending the current one? What reasons might push us in that direction? There are assorted minor benefits, one of which I will mention in closing. But the heart of the argument is this. In my view, the single worst feature of our current Constitution is the Article V amendment process. I have written about this elsewhere: the problem is not only, as is often said, that it is too hard to amend the Constitution, but that the amendment process itself is wildly undemocratic. Ratification requires three-fourths of the states, either through their state legislatures or through special ratifying conventions. This gives the inhabitants of large states like California or Texas vastly less influence in the amendment process than those of small states like Wyoming or Delaware. The Article V ratification mechanism is as undemocratic as the Senate, and in some ways worse because of the requirement of a three-fourths majority.

Here, I want to expound a bit more on the significance of these problems with Article V, why these flaws are so damaging to the democratic legitimacy of the entire Constitution. The theory of the American government is, as Thomas Jefferson put it in the Declaration of Independence, that “whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends” – i.e., securing the natural, inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness – “it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.” This right to alter or abolish a destructive government is known as the “right of revolution,” and can be traced back to the political theory of John Locke (as can most of the ideas in the Declaration).

For Locke, the right of revolution is exercised by dissolving the existing government and creating a new one from scratch. The Framers of the American Constitution had another idea. Not only was the Constitution made by the People, through the ratification process of 1787-89, it could also be remade by the People. Not necessarily unmade: the People, through their representatives, could alter their form of government without abolishing it, not through revolution but through established, lawful process. In some ways this was the single most radical feature of the 1787 Constitution, our greatest innovation in the field of political theory. And indeed, it is only because the Constitution permitted for its own amendment that it is a document worthy of admiration today. It is through the amendment process, after all, that the Bill of Rights was adopted, that slavery was abolished, that African-Americans and women gained the right to vote.

The amendment process, moreover, plays an essential role in maintaining the democratic legitimacy of the Constitution. We talk sometimes about how the “dead hand of the past” problem: why should this document, made by a small, insular political class of white men (many of whom held slaves) over two hundred years ago, tell us how to live in the present? Fixating on the exclusion of, e.g., women and black people from political participation at the Founding is almost missing the point: even if the Constitution had been made through pure universal suffrage, what would give the people of 1787 this power over the people of 2026?

The answer can only be that the Constitution made in 1787 only binds us because we have chosen, of our own free will, to be bound by it. We have taken it as our own, not merely our inheritance but our own enactment. How can this be so? Why, because we could have changed the thing, if we had wanted to. Because we have the power of amendment, it may be inferred that what we have left in place unamended meets with our approval. The amendment process, in other words, is the link between the People and their Constitution on an ongoing basis. Admittedly, the same kind of inference could be drawn from our failure to exercise the Lockean right of revolution. But amendment through a lawful, orderly process is quite a bit less costly than dissolving the government altogether, and the negative inference from our failure to act is more easily drawn the less costly it would have been to take action. In a very real sense, then, the amendment process constitutes the American People as the sovereign power of the nation.

And it is grotesquely flawed. The opening words of the Constitution proclaim that it is made by “We, the People of the United States.” This was the subject of great controversy at the time: Antifederalists like Patrick Henry would have preferred the constituent power be identified as “We, the States.” That controversy continued well after the Founding, as men like John C. Calhoun insisted that, preamble notwithstanding, the Constitution was truly nothing more than a compact among the states; it took a civil war to prove him wrong. Article V, however, shows the preamble to be a lie. No, the Constitution is not a mere compact of sovereign states, as Calhoun would have it. But neither is it truly an enactment of the People of the nation. Rather, sovereign power as organized by the Constitution is held by “We, the People of the several States.” It is not a single People, united on terms of democratic equality, but thirteen (now fifty) separate Peoples, united only through their states. (The same flaw is to be found in the Article VII ratification process, but it is less significant for two reasons: first, that the legitimacy of the original ratification is, at this late hour, not really the point; and second, because the Constitution took effect only in those states ratifying it, where majority support was guaranteed.)

The most urgent business of constitutional reform, in my judgment, is to fix this. The People of the United States must truly be made sovereign over their Constitution, as a single democratic body. This is both a philosophical and a practical imperative: practical because virtually none of the rest of the work that is to be done can be done through Article V as it stands. To take only the most acute example, it cannot be expected that the Article V process will ever address the disaster that is the U.S. Senate, and not only because the text of Article V expressly forbids it: the flaw in the composition of the Senate is exactly matched in Article V.

Now in and of itself, this does not require making a whole new constitution. Indeed it does not require changing anything in the substance of the Constitution at all. We could, for example, pass a single amendment repealing Article V and replacing it with a better, more democratic amendment process. Of course trying to do this through Article V itself would be unlikely to succeed; perhaps we would need to use the “Pack the Union” gimmick to overcome this inertia. Alternately, we might simply draw upon the inalienable sovereignty of the People to justify ignoring Article V altogether, as Professor Akhil Amar has suggested. This would mean adopting some new amendment (either simply changing the amendment process itself, or making some substantive change, e.g. to the Senate) through a popular, democratic process nowhere established in law. Either way, the sovereign, constituent power of the People of the United States would thereby have been reconstituted, placed on a new foundation.

Here’s the thing, though: in a very real sense, this would be the adoption of a whole new constitution. Yes, that new constitution would be largely identical to the old one, with perhaps one major change. But it would nevertheless be a brand new enactment, from start to finish. How can it be otherwise? The People of the United States, strictly speaking, have never made a constitution; only the People of the several States have done that. Any enactment by the former, then, would have to be new. Even if they made no other change to the document, the People of 2026 would have freshly adopted the 1787 Constitution as their own. In my view, this would be an act of extraordinary significance. Much of our problem today is that the People do not feel a strong connection to their Constitution, do not regard it as a set of commitments they themselves have undertaken. And why should they? A new moment of ratification, by a newly constituted sovereign People, would fix this sense of alienation, even if no substantive provisions were changed.

But if all of this is right, if fixing the amendment process and thereby fixing the foundation on which the Constitution’s authority rests would be to adopt a new constitution in truth, then why not say so? Why minimize the significance of what we do? Why not proclaim it openly? Again, the idea as I see it would not be to repudiate the existing constitutional tradition. It was never intended that the People be alienated from their Constitution in the manner I have described. In making this new version of the American Constitution, then, we would only be making real the way the 1787 Constitution conceptualized itself from the start, what the soldiers of the Union Army bled for. Again, it would not be strictly necessary to frame the new enactment this way: fixing the amendment process and then adopting whatever substantive reforms are needful would achieve all the same goals. But there is a virtue in being forthright.

There is another benefit as well, which is of particular importance for purposes of this thought experiment. If we pursue constitutional reform through a sequence of amendments, the only reforms that will happen are the very most important. Each individual change would need to have a strong enough imperative behind it to motivate an amendment. By adopting the form of a whole new constitution, however, we would also be able to make a slew of more minor changes along the way. We have been living under this Constitution for nearly two and a half centuries; we have learned much in that time, things that the Framers of the original Constitution couldn’t have known. We have seen all sorts of ways in which the original design did not quite work right, most of which have never been important enough to warrant fixing by amendment. A new constitution would create space for a kind of “spring cleaning,” touching up every aspect of the document with the benefit of this added experience.

To take one small example, the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right of trial by jury in civil suits with at least $20 in controversy. Today, that means any civil suit with any monetary stakes whatsoever. This makes no sense. If we want to guarantee jury trial in all damages suits, we should just remove the monetary threshold. If, on the other hand, we want the threshold to mean something, the number has to be a lot higher. The $75,000 figure used for federal diversity jurisdiction would make some sense; you could also expressly provide for the threshold to grow with inflation. Or perhaps the criterion should be something different altogether; that is the route I have taken in my proposal. I have made other, similar small modifications throughout the document, drawing on my own sense of what has worked and what has not worked in the Constitution that we have. This “spring cleaning” element would not be enough to justify making a whole new constitution, all by itself. But it is surely a pleasant upside, if we were to decide to take that course for other reasons.

One final point: this proposal reflects solely my own point of view. I did not consult with anyone else while drafting it; I drew solely upon my own experience thinking about and engaging with the Constitution. I do not imagine that the document I have drafted could, or even should, simply be adopted without revision. The task of constitutional reform is far bigger than any one person. That is why the Reconstitution Project will seek out many different perspectives on these great questions, and why the vision is for each of those individual contributions to be as distinctive and original as possible. A time will come to bring all of these diverse perspectives together, to put them in conversation with one another. For now, however, this is simply my contribution.

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